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This literature review focuses on recent and contemporary tenancy structures in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. Tenancy for purposes of this review is broadly defined to include different
leasing arrangements such sharecropping, labor tenancy, fixed cash rentals, and reverse leasing.
One should also note that we have limited our discussion to private leasing of agricultural land,
thereby ignoring issues pertaining to leasing of public, forest, and other noncrop lands.
The distant past is marred by the lack of adequate implementation of and impact from land
lease regulations instituted during processes of agrarian reform. As a result, the recent past is
characterized by a zealous desire to remove all restrictions on new lease contracts. Gyanendra
Mani and Pandey (1995) draw attention to the renewed call for freeing lease markets from
legislative control citing several authors who argue for such a redirection of policy based on both
equity and efficiency grounds. Today we ask whether there is a middle way. This literature
review will not dwell on tenancy legislation itself but rather will focus on actual practices and the
impacts of legislation. While there has been a shift in the 1990s in the policy orientation for
tenancy legislation and regulations away from social concerns to market-oriented ones, the
literature on this trend and its impacts is very thin and not yet widely available.
The terms of reference for this project are predicated on the suggestion that “…it is possible
to devise correct arrangements that balance the interests of the landowner and the tenant and
which can improve access to farms and lead to better agricultural production and improved
stewardship of the land.” The purpose of this literature review, therefore, is to provide a basis for
evaluation of the desirability, feasibility, and potential content of regulatory guidelines for lease
agreements that might permit the land-lease market to operate effectively.
The works discussed herein are both theoretical and empirical. We have attempted to locate
the most recent literature on tenancy for these three regions. If contemporary literature is scarce
or if historical developments are useful to understanding current tenancy trends, references and
inclusion of recent past experiences and dynamics are included. As can be expected, the
availability of studies on tenancy in the three regions is quite different.2
The literature review on Asia focuses on the vast number of studies on tenancy relations in
India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the Philippines and highlights post-1990 literature. Only
occasional mention is made to other Asian countries.
1 These four countries provide a diverse
context from which to draw illustrations of the main points of evaluation. Finally, the discussion
is focused primarily on sharecrop tenancy contracts. This reflects the historical predominance of
this form of land leasing in the region and a strong bias in the literature. Although sharecrop
tenancy is often compared to other kinds of leases (e.g., fixed rent contracts), too little attention
has been given to the nature of such contract alternatives when chosen.
In Latin America, much has been written on tenancy arrangements over the past seventy-
plus years as social movements have pushed governments to restrict the economic power of
owners of large estates and to eliminate highly exploitative tenancy arrangements. During the
last few decades, there has also been much debate over the capitalist or noncapitalist nature of
agricultural production in Latin America and why tenancy arrangements, particularly
sharecropping, instead of wage labor are still so prevalent. Currently, no one questions the
capitalist nature of agriculture in Latin America and studies are exploring the different and
innovative land and labor arrangements being utilized by agricultural enterprises. Few studies,
however, supply data on the financial-economic aspects of these tenancy arrangements; the
majority focus on socio-political factors and the broader economic aspects of tenancy as
production and labor systems.
African region is very scarce, necessitating reliance on available studies of practices over the
past few decades in order to tease out current tendencies. In any case, referring to historical
developments is useful for understanding contemporary practices. In addition, the literature is
almost exclusively ethnographic and historical, giving us a very vivid and rich picture of the
different tenancy practices that have been used. Much of the most recent literature focuses on the
adaptability of customary tenure and its own tenancy arrangements to changing conditions in
African agriculture and production demands. What is not available are “hard” data on the
frequency of tenancy and its financial implications.
2.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Tenancy is a complex production system combining labor and land rights in order to generate
income and agricultural products. As such, theories on tenancy can focus on its many different
aspects. In this section, we will review economic theories which focus on production efficiency
issues and land tenure theories which focus on land rights, tenure systems, and tenure relations.
2.1 LAND TENURE ISSUES
There is an obvious relationship between tenancy as a labor-production system and the land
tenure system as it determines access to land. Tenancy arrangements are utilized when land
cannot be acquired (e.g., ownership concentration, customary law restricting land sales, land
reform restrictions, lack of capital) or when producers prefer not to tie capital into long-term
investments such as land purchase and/or want to avoid wage labor costs. Changes in land tenure
                                               
1 Balisacan (1994) does a very nice job of succinctly comparing across several of the countries in the region.3
systems (e.g., customary vs. freehold tenure, ownership vs. usufruct rights, increased ownership
concentration) are reflected in different tenancy arrangements and conditions.
Tenancy arrangements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have not always followed a linear
developmental pattern from labor tenancy to sharecropping to fixed cash rent, but rather have
often ranged back and forth from one type of tenancy to another as conditions (such as factor and
product markets, agrarian policies, technology, land distribution, demographics, off-farm
employment) change. Nor is it uncommon for there to be several types of tenancy and other
labor arrangements co-existing in a region, for example, reverse leasing and wage labor, contract
farming and cash rentals, labor tenancy and direct production by landholder. What is common in
different tenancy arrangements is that some farmers have labor and/or capital but do not have the
land to fully utilize these resources, while others have land which they are not working because
of reduced access to labor or capital, for example, or no interest in directly engaging in
agricultural production.
2.1.1 Land tenure background in the three regions
Agrarian structure in Asia is typically characterized as unimodal recognizing the dominance of
family and subfamily small farm units. Despite the devotion of so much attention to
sharecropping, the dominant form of tenancy in Asia, the data clearly show the prevalence of
owner cultivation. There are, however, some current and past exceptions. Plantation agriculture
dominates with its typical bimodal distribution of land in some regions, for example, Central
Luzon, Philippines. In India, prior to the tenancy reforms of the 1950s, the state was the owner of
much of the land which was leased to cultivators via a chain of intermediaries with rights to
collect rents for the use of land. Thus, a reading of the literature on land tenure in Asia highlights
a wide diversity of scenarios varying in the extent of ownership versus tenancy and also in the
presence of various types of tenancy contracts.
At the risk of overgeneralizing, land tenure systems in Latin America have historically been
based on private ownership and concentration of agricultural land in the hands of a minority and
a large sector of land-poor and landless peasant families. The resulting land tenure structure has
been one of landowners sitting on large extensions of land (particularly the best arable land) and
needing labor to work it, while the majority of the rural population farm very small parcels and
are compelled to use their labor to gain access to more land.
In sub-Saharan Africa, in spite of extensive land appropriation during the colonial era and
the existence of large estates, monopoly over land was not as comprehensive as in Latin America
and control over labor was more tenuous.
2 Customary land tenure systems have remained very
vibrant, adapting to changing conditions as colonialists came and went, cash crops boomed and
busted, and oppressive tax and labor regulations were enforced. Thus, while there are areas of
land concentration and scarcity where colonial regimes appropriated large extensions of land and
introduced private property, land tenure in Africa continues to be characterized by customary
ownership and a relatively egalitarian distribution of land among rural households.
The implications of these land tenure systems for tenancy is not that one system breeds
tenancy relations because of land concentration while the other obviates the need for tenancy, but
rather that the conditions for and characteristics of tenancy relations will vary across regions
                                               
2 The one major exception is South Africa.4
according to agronomic and socioeconomic conditions. As we will show later, in Asia there is
growing evidence which questions the paradigm of large landowner exploiting the poor, landless
(or land-poor) tenant. Often, small-farm owners lease land among their class members. In Latin
America, tenancy tends to be characterized by unequal relations—one party has overwhelming
control over land (and usually over other resources as well) and is able largely to determine
tenancy conditions. But tenancy is also practiced among smallholders. In Africa, where the great
majority of rural households have access to land and economic power is not concentrated among
a minority of the local population, tenancy arises out of situations of resource imbalances (often
temporary) among households or between communities. Tenancy offers an opportunity for
households to share resources, particularly for the production of cash crops.
2.1.2 Recent changes in land tenure systems
While these generalized and brief descriptions of land tenure and tenancy systems in the three
regions are still largely valid today, there have been major changes in these regions over the last
few decades. For example, in Asia, recent data reveals new trends of capitalist tenancy (modern
capitalist farms leasing in land) and of reverse leasing (land-poor household leasing out land).
Also, with modernization there is a tendency to switch from sharecrop contracts to fixed rent or
even fixed wage relations for production.
In Latin America, agrarian reform (or the threat of reform) has diminished land
concentration; large estates have become medium-sized farms producing highly commercial
agricultural products. Redistribution of land (through both land reform and the land market) has
eased the pressure on land in some countries, but there are others (e.g., Guatemala and Brazil)
where a highly dualistic land tenure structure still exists. In addition, commercial agriculture
increasingly dominates production and agribusiness firms are becoming important players, able
to determine the use of land and labor as well as the agricultural production system itself. The
implications for tenancy is that the drive behind tenancy arrangements is shifting from
landownership concentration and its corresponding land scarcity to the pursuit of high-quality
and low-cost agricultural products.
Recent developments in Africa that affect land tenure and tenancy are the increasing
commercialization of agricultural production and the privatization of landownership. As Africa
becomes inexorably drawn into capitalist production and the global market, land becomes an
asset and a scarce commodity and rights to land become private and more individualized. The
tension between customary tenure with its relatively egalitarian practices and capitalist
production based on profits and markets continues to be played out.
3 Traditional tenancy that
previously was based on resource imbalances among households and involved symbolic rents is
becoming tenancy arrangements based land’s production potential for commercial crops and
rents calculated on the asset value of land. Difficult conditions for market-oriented production,
however, and the continued strength of customary tenure would seem to make any projections
regarding tenancy very tentative. Some authors (e.g., Little and Watts 1994) maintain that
contract farming is the path that capitalist production will take in Africa. The implications for
tenancy are that it may become an insignificant land-labor arrangement for commercial
agriculture but continue to be utilized for subsistence food crops.
                                               
3 Many African countries (e.g., Mozambique, Uganda, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Botswana)
are currently considering and debating new land legislation that both reflects this tension and seeks to resolve it.5
2.2 ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ISSUES
Economic theory on tenancy revolves around two key questions: What can we say about the
relative efficiency (static and dynamic) of various forms of tenancy? And, if a certain form of
tenancy, particularly sharecropping, is conceptually judged inefficient, why does it persist? There
is a great deal of writing about these questions and there already exists very many reviews of this
literature.
4 The most comprehensive and current review of the literature, both theoretical and
empirical, is that published by Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992). It is common for an author
of an empirical investigation to begin his/her paper with a synopsis of the theoretical literature
and sometimes of the relevant empirical work as well. Thus, excellent reviews can be found with
each providing some variation in focus and in depth on any particular issue. Some of the best
(comprehensive and easy for a layperson to understand) include the works of Sadoulet, de
Janvry, and Fukui (1997), Ray (1998), Ghosh (1995), Teh (1991), Bhaumik (1991, 1994), Cheng
(1993), Peach and Nowotny (1992), Skoufias (1995), and Carter and Kanel (1992).
For the sake of the reader who is new to this literature, we have extracted a synopsis of the
key points (taken from Birthal and Singh 1994, p. 187):
The literature on tenancy suggests that the dominant form of contract may vary with
the crop, natural conditions for crop production, prevailing technology, development of
markets, distributional pattern of land and assets, development of human capital,
development of agriculture vis-à-vis other sectors of the economy and other
characteristics of socio-economic environment. Theoretical and empirical analysis of
agrarian structure has offered three types of explanations for the co-existence of
different forms of contracts: (i) trade-off between risk sharing and transactions costs,
(ii) screening of workers of different qualities, and (iii) non-existent or imperfect factor
markets.
Adam Smith (1776), Marshall (1920)…viewed share tenancy as an inefficient form
of land tenure…. [Based on inadequate incentives for labor effort and land
improvements] Cheung (1969) under the assumption of no uncertainty and equal
transactions costs for all kinds of contracts showed that share contracts are as efficient
in resource allocation as fixed rental or wage contracts provided that the landlord is
able to stipulate the labor supply of the tenant.
The literature that followed these seminal works offers a huge discourse about who was
right—the “Marshallian school” or the “Cheungian school.” While some authors support either
one of these camps, a vast literature has evolved which views sharecrop tenure as efficient in a
second-best world as per the three explanations given by Birthal and Singh in the quotation
presented above. Carter and Kanel summarize appropriately: “Recent research identifies a
multiplicity of economic rationale and a multiplicity of economic function fulfilled by share
contracts in a world of missing and imperfect markets” (Carter and Kanel 1992, p.1).
In addition to this brief synopsis of the main elements of theory, we highlight some recent
methodological contributions. We think these contributions are most useful in the context of the
goal of establishing good practical guidelines (the empirical results of these studies are
incorporated in the remaining sections of this paper):
                                               
4 The majority of the empirical research reviewed reports on studies conducted in Asian countries.6
¤ Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Fukui (1997), using data from a 1992 survey of three Philippine
villages, test for efficiency differences across sharecrop contracts made among kin and
impersonal sharecrop contracts rather than the typical comparison between sharecrop
contracts and fixed rent contracts or owner-cultivators. This is relevant because it sheds light
on the issue of the context in which sharecropping may prove inefficient.
¤ Ghosh (1995) offers a theoretical model featuring a multiplicity and diversity of contracts
which is a step in the direction of better matching of theory with empirical reality and hence
improving the ability to draw policy-relevant conclusions from theoretical analysis.
¤ Cheng (1993) includes a review of the discussion in the literature of the circumstances under
which sharecropping is expected to decline in importance and also of the role of land
reforms in this process.
¤ Skoufias (1995) presents an econometric model of land leasing which explicitly assesses the
importance of various types of transactions costs gaining more depth into the question of the
conditions under which particular contract structures might prevail.
¤ Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) focus on the comparison of labor employment and land
tenancy contracts (rather than among types of tenancy contracts). They point out that
permanent labor contracts are scant in southeast Asia but fairly common in India and ask
why this is so. In practice, this pattern appears to reflect the caste system and anti-tenancy
legislation in India and the absence of such in southeast Asian countries, suggesting that the
permanent labor contract is a substitute for tenancy. This empirical observation gave
direction to their 1992 work in which they generalize the theoretical framework for analysis
of share tenancy.
¤ Finally, one last paper worth mentioning specifically is Patnaik (1994). This author takes an
unusual twist on the subject by offering a very thorough comparison of the Marxian and the
neoclassical approaches to the subject. For our purposes this is not particularly useful, but it
does raise the following useful critiques of theory (note: these are points which one can
observe when considering the empirical evidence). First, the neoclassical literature tends to
treat the peasant/tenant as a homogeneous agent. Patnaik says “The very terms in which the
discussion is carried on appear highly unrealistic as soon as it is recognized that large
inter-unit variations exist in scale, objective function, organization and labor processes…”
(Patnaik 1994, p. 160). Perhaps that is why there are so many variations on the two main
modeling themes—Marshallian and Cheungian.
Along the same lines, Patnaik (1994) accurately notes that while the evidence points to
multiple kinds of inter- and especially intra-class contracting, the literature tends to focus on
interclass transactions in which the landlord is rich and the tenant is poor—thus, presuming
exploitation. This is an important point, because the viewpoint of past policy has been similarly
narrow. Carter and Kanel (1992) discuss this point also and refer to several papers that cite
counter examples to the stereotype assumed so often in the theoretical modeling exercises, for
example., they mention “dependent landlordism.”7
2.3 TENANCY VERSUS OWNERSHIP
Landownership versus various tenancy arrangements is another topic of interest. Much of the
criticism of tenancy relations and the impetus of reform movements to eliminate tenancy are
based on the assumption that tenancy is inefficient (because of absolute land rent and agency
factors) and unjust, and that agricultural production on owner-occupied farms is preferable.
These same movements, however, failed to promote an environment for successful ownership of
land. Some elements of such an environment include sufficient size of holding, positive attitude
towards work and saving, freedom of management and availability of supporting institutions.
Is landownership necessary for efficient agricultural production? In other words, are there
conditions under which tenancy production is as efficient as owner-occupied farming? Our
reading of the literature seems to indicate that tenancy can be an efficient form of agricultural
production under the following conditions:
¤ secure tenure for tenant with regard to number of rights (e.g., right to make and profit from
improvements) and length of contract (e.g., no arbitrary eviction);
¤ secure tenure with regard to ownership rights for landowner; and
¤ rental rate reflects productivity potential of land and includes very low absolute land rent.
An interesting question related to this issue is why landowners engage in tenancy instead of
direct production or even selling the land. Binswanger, Deininger, and Feder (1993, 1995), for
example, examine why sharecropping is preferred to alternatives such as hiring wage labor, fixed
rent contracts, and selling the land in the context of land ownership concentration. They point out
that where there are imperfect credit markets and labor supervision problems, sharecropping is a
feasible and attractive arrangement when compared to direct production with wage labor or to
fixed cash rental, in spite of the incentive problem inherent in sharecropping.
Putting land on the sale market also has its drawbacks. Capital market constraints make it
difficult for smallholder producers to purchase land. In addition, the lack of crop insurance
makes it extremely risky for them to obtain mortgages. Owners of large landholdings are also
able to profit from state subsidies and programs that increase their profits, decreasing motivation
to sell land they are not directly farming. These subsidies increase the value of land beyond its
production potential making land purchase unattainable by smallholders with no capital equity.
2.3.1 Tenancy and family-life cycle
An argument often advanced among proponents of tenancy is that such arrangements give
landless and land-poor producers access to land and the opportunity to accumulate capital for the
eventual acquisition of land. This thesis can be likened to Chayanov’s family life-cycle theory of
the peasantry (Chayanov 1986). Briefly, Chayanov’s theory maintains that the peasant family
goes through four different life-cycle stages, starting out as a small unit composed of a young
couple, who then proceed to have a number of children who, in turn, grow up to be young adults
and eventually set up their own households. In the last stage, the aging couple are once again
alone. In each of these stages, resources, land, and family labor are acquired and allocated to
agricultural production at different levels of quantity and intensity in order to cover the family’s
changing consumption needs. This theory assumes that the land and resources for peasant
agricultural production and the family’s reproduction are accessible as their needs change over
time.8
When adapted to tenancy and tenure structure, the family life-cycle thesis maintains that the
young land-poor peasant family sharecrops or rents in land in order to gain access to land. As the
peasant family matures, it is able to accumulate enough savings to purchase land and become a
landowning family.
5 This land is eventually distributed among the adult children when the
parents die or stop farming. Since the amount of land each child receives is not enough to sustain
a family, sharecropping or renting arrangements are sought, repeating the cycle of the parents.
This process in peasant agriculture has been, under certain circumstances (such as readily
accessible land), found in all three regions during the life cycle of the family. An example is
found in the abusa arrangements in Ghana where a sharecropper eventually becomes proprietor
of the cocoa farm he has been developing and tending (Robertson 1982). However, in the context
of contemporary capitalist agricultural production, land-poor peasant families are not likely to
gain access to more productive land. The more common process within a peasant community is
that a minority of peasants become capitalist farmers, purchasing land as well as renting or
sharecropping with other families (Lehmann 1986). The larger proportion of peasant families are
unable to accumulate capital and become land- and resource-poor or landless. This is
increasingly the case as agricultural production becomes dependent on more outside factors:
¤ technology from outside the community and even outside the country,
¤ inputs that need to be purchased and may even be imported,
¤ product markets that are outside their region and are often export markets,
¤ prices that are determined outside of their community and area, often on the global market,
and
¤ increasing dependency on capital and credit.
The capital and information (with regard to technology, markets, credit sources) needed to
participate in this type of agricultural production is often out of the reach of most peasant
families. Evidence of this development is revealed in the literature search.
Against this theoretical background, the rest of this paper presents a core of information in a
way which sheds light on the question: Is there a middle ground between the excessive tenancy
regulations that restrict the supply flow between landowners and potential tenants, on the one
hand, and the complete deregulation of leasing that often leads to exploitative, and possibly
inefficient, production systems? The discussion is organized around three main themes within
each region. First, we present what the literature reveals about tenancy trends within the region,
portraying the scenario with regard to the types and terms of contractual relations and with
regard to the character of the principal parties to land-lease contracts. Next, we focus on the
rationale that may explain these trends. Finally, within rationale, we include a subsection that
specifically focuses on the small amount of commentary in the literature regarding policy
choices.
3.0 TENANCY IN THE ASIAN CONTEXT
Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) suggest the two basic stylized facts about land leasing are
(a) that sharecropping has been pervasive through history and across many different places; and
                                               
5 Some authors such as R.L. Berry (n.d.) refer to a tenure ladder to describe the progression of a land-poor farmer
from sharecroppers to renters to landowner.9
(b) that there has been a recent decline in its presence in more developed areas. In this section,
we will provide more detailed documentation of the scenario in Asia behind these two stylized
facts.
3.1 TRENDS IN LAND TENANCY IN ASIA
In Asia, it is typical to observe a variety of contractual choices within a particular locality,
although there is usually one form which dominates (Ghosh 1995; Gautam 1995; Sharma 1995;
Taslim and Ahmed 1993). Overall, it seems that share tenancy is the predominant contractual
choice in the majority of study cites. It is important, however, to stress that owner-cultivation is
far more prevalent, and increasingly so, than any form of leasehold tenure. For example, Bhawan
(1997) reports that, at the all-India level, in 1992, only 15 percent of households lease-in land. It
is important to note that this small percentage is constituted by a very large number of
households (Bhawan cites 27 million households from the 1972 census data for India but he does
not provide the comparable 1992 figure). Wiradi and Shand (1986) document the same pattern
for Indonesia. Tongroj Onchan (1990), writing about Thailand, says that 14 percent of
households lease-in with regional pockets where the rate reaches up to 30 percent of the area.
Somewhat exceptionally, Taslim and Ahmed (1993) report a figure of 40 percent for
Bangladesh.
In India, the Green Revolution combined with land reform legislation induced a large-scale
resumption of land by the owner for cultivation (Parthasarthy 1991, Sharma 1995). Bhawan
(1997) more generally observes that tenancy is least common in areas of India with greater
presence of commercial agricultural enterprises. Similarly, Wiradi and Shand (1986) make a
casual observation that in the five years prior to their research in Indonesia (i.e., 1980–85) the
introduction of high-yield varieties (HYV) of rice implied less willingness of owners to let out
their land. Kasryno (1981) also observes that ownership is more prevalent in highly productive
areas whereas leasing is more prevalent in less productive regions of Indonesia.
3.1.1 Types and terms of contracts for land leasing
The form of tenancy contract that will dominate seems to be predictable according to
agroeconomic characteristics of the area. There appears to be a correlation between
modernization (e.g., HYV and irrigation) and the presence of fixed-rent contracts (Fujimoto
1996; Khasnabis 1994; Chadha and Bhaumik 1992). Khasnabis (1994) reports fixed-rent tenancy
as the only contractual form used for the new, modern crop production in his survey villages in
West Bengal. Birthal and Singh (1994) also cite studies that observe the conversion from share
tenancy to fixed-wage relations with technical progress.
Yokoyama (1995) presents yet another illustration. In his study area in West Java,
traditionally share tenancy accounted for 43 percent of all tenancy contracts. This percentage
dramatically decreased in the context of vegetable growing—0 percent share contracts, 72
percent fixed cash-rent contracts, and 28 percent fixed in-kind rent contracts. He attributes this
pattern to the lack of a tradition defining a standard expectation of yields and by the greater
variability of yields due to hard-to-observe factors like effort. Vegetables are labor-intensive and
so the problem of effort monitoring is exaggerated.10
Reduction of risk is a factor. For example, the incidence of fixed-rent contracts is greater in
areas or seasons with less weather-related risk (Gautam 1995). Ray explains that “…fixed-rent
tenancy requires that the tenant be willing and able to bear the risks of agricultural production”
(Ray 1998, p. 419). On the other hand, Yokoyama (1995) points out that since vegetable crops
are risky and require the purchase of chemical inputs, one might expect to find share tenancy.
The puzzling observation of fixed rent tenancy in the presence of significant risk, he argues, is
resolved by understanding the multiple roles of the middlemen who market the crops. They
assume the role of lender in-kind for inputs and a sort of insurance in that they allow deferred
payment when yields are very poor.
Two final points were found in the literature regarding the predominance of fixed-rent
contracts. Skoufias (1995) observes that 76 percent of leased area is subject to fixed-rent
arrangements in an area with a large number of absentee landlords. Additionally, some authors
associate fixed-rent contracts with tight labor markets (Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio 1992).
Converse to the observations about fixed-rent tenancy, sharecrop agreements are observed
to be more prevalent in less developed regions (Birthal and Singh 1994). Yokoyama’s (1995)
evidence indicates that within an area, the poorer farmers with less access to the formal sector
tend to opt for traditional crop sharing arrangements. Parthasarthy (1991) indicates that,
seemingly in contradiction to the above, in India during the period of 1960–1980, share tenancy
significantly replaced - tenancies despite the nascent Green Revolution. However, he asserts that
this observation can be argued to result as a reaction to regulation of tenancy. Share
arrangements are easier to conceal, thereby allowing landlords and tenants to continue leasing in
an unregulated fashion. Sawant (1991) deduces from discrepancies in official data sources that
there is quite a substantial amount of concealed tenancy in India.
Parthasarthy (1991) also clearly identifies modernization as a causal factor in the appearance
of “capitalist” tenancy and reverse leasing, trends which are not found in the poorer regions of
the country. Capitalist tenancy refers to large- and medium-scale farm operations that use at least
some leased-in land (as opposed to a small peasant farm). Reverse leasing refers to the leasing-
out of land by the land-poor households to others with more means. Birthal and Singh (1994)
indicate an increase in capitalist tenancy but suggest that reverse leasing is minimal. Bhawan
(1997) also notes that reverse tenancy is an “important aspect” of the increasing
commercialization of agriculture. He suggests, however, that reverse tenancy is not generally
characteristic.
Thus, Cheng (1993), after reviewing the literature, concludes that there is much support for
the observation that with progress comes with a switch away from sharecrop to other forms of
leasehold tenures. Sharma (1995) notes the same. In addition, he attributes the rise in cases of
reverse leasing to the spread of new technology and the associated increase in profitability of
farming. Leasing allows the flexibility in the context of inability to expand via purchase given
the ceiling on landholdings. The fact that agricultural income is tax-free may be the real stimulus
for such expansion.
Regarding the terms of contracts, the 50/50 share agreement is most commonly cited (e.g.,
Birthal and Singh 1994) for crop-share arrangement. However, a wide variety of other splits have
been observed. Whether or not and how costs are shared figures into the determination of the
output share ratio. In instances of agrarian reform, terms are set more favorable to tenant, for
example, landlord’s share not to exceed 25 percent. Fujimoto (1996) observes that in the villages11
he studied in Malaysia and Taiwan up to 10 percent of all tenancy contracts were rent-free. Such
intrafamily “land lending” arrangements are not a concern in the context of this report. In India,
“rack-renting” (the process by which a chain of subleases causes the cultivator to pay
extraordinarily high rents/shares) is an issue in the presence of concealed tenancy (e.g., see
discussion in Parthasarthy 1991).
3.1.2 Data issues
The last subsection provides a rich description of the tenancy scenario in Asia. Despite the vast
quantity of data and empirical analysis available, the conclusions are still not highly reliable.
Before moving to a discussion of the logic driving the observed trends, it is important to note
some substantial caveats to the extant empirical research. Here we briefly identify the set of
issues that plague the empirical work that has been conducted to date. One should note that these
problems persist despite the large number of papers written which purport to redress one or
another of these issues.
First, there are very few longitudinal data sets that allow one to explore the dynamic aspects
of contractual choice within a constant context. Fujimoto (1996) is a small exception. His work
includes a panel data set for a few of the ten villages that he surveyed. Second, the data sets that
are the basis for all of the analyses are very dated. Very few authors have data collected after
mid-1980s. Even these papers published in the post-1990 era often rely on pre-1990 data and
tend not to add substantially new evidence (or approach). An exception is Gautam (1995) who
uses data for some villages in India collected over the period of 1991–1994. This means that the
trends described easily refer to the scenario of more than a decade ago. In order to make
currently relevant guidelines for land tenancy contracts, an appraisal of the direction that these
trends are taking today is needed.
6
A third issue is the problem of underestimating the extent of leasing and the presence of
certain forms of tenancy (share tenancy in particular). This problem arises because data sources
often rely only on registration information—that is, registered lease contracts. Bansil (1992),
speaking of Haryana, India, observes that most tenancies are oral and hence do not appear in
revenue records. Guatam (1995) and Kasryno (1981) discuss the same issue in the context of
southeast Asia. Bansil (1992) also points out the difficulty of using recorded data arising from
the fact that the manner of registration makes it difficult to come up with total holdings of an
individual who may rent parcels in multiple localities and from multiple persons. Parthasarthy
(1991), Ray (1998), and Sharma (1995) also indicate likely underestimating in official data for
India.
Furthermore, the interpretation of statistics on tenancy relations is complicated. For
example, many tenants are tenants cum agricultural (or casual) laborers. People tend to report the
more prestigious occupation, which in this context is tenant instead of laborer. This explains the
existence of millions of holdings of 0.5 or 1 acre in the statistics, even in nonirrigated areas. The
growth of nonagricultural jobs is also very important in a number of countries. Some people
choose to retain the land as security in case of failure in their new job, for speculation, and to
                                               
6 Effort should also be made to incorporate the recent Vietnamese experience with the introduction of leases up to 40
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have land for home construction for the next generation of family. Typically, some of the land is
cultivated part-time by relatives while the rest is leased.
Another issue is the problem of determining causality where a positive impact on
productivity is indicated. Specifically, how can one assess the impact of tenancy reform versus
the impact of multiple aspects of more broadly conceived agrarian reform such as irrigation and
credit programs (see discussion in Chakrabarty 1996). Finally, there exist some definitional
problems in analysis and in census data. For example, there is some ambiguity about “owner”
versus “tenant” that arises in the presence of mixed forms of tenure (see discussion in Bhaumik
1991 and in Sawant 1991).
3.1.3 Characteristics of tenants
In many places, the typical tenant is not a pure-tenant but rather an owner-cultivator who
expands his holdings via contracting (Fujimoto 1996; Khasnabis 1994; Chadha and Baumik
1992; Walker, Singh, and Ballabh 1990). In India, the vast majority of tenants are landless or
land-poor (Parthasarthy 1991; Khasnabis 1994; Chadha and Bhaumik 1992; Sharma 1995).
Wijaya (1981) and Kasryno (1981) indicate the same for Indonesia. However, Birthal and Singh
(1994) point out that, at least in their study regions, the medium and large farmers, however few
in number, account for more than 50 percent of the leased-in area. Patnaik says the same is true
at all India level: “…about 55 percent of the total area under lease is with the top three quintiles
of holdings ranked by operational size” (Patnaik 1994, p. 160). Chadha and Bhaumik (1992)
note that the incidence of such reverse or capitalist tenancy tends to be more common in more
developed regions. Sharma (1995) provides a regional portrayal of both tenants and landlords
according to farm size. He observes pockets where the traditional large “exploiting the rich”
pattern persists and pockets where the reverse is prevalent. The conclusion is that the overall
pattern is of small-to-small lease transactions in many locations.
3.1.4 Characteristics of landlords
As is implicit in the characterization of tenants presented above, in many instances, particularly
in India, the lessors are marginal farmers whose land is not sufficient for subsistence. Owners let
the land and go to work as wage earners. Other small but not marginal farmers may lease out
their land for lack of bullocks to work the land (Gyanendra Mani and Gandhi 1994; Parthasarthy
1991; Sharma 1995). Walker, Singh, and Ballabh (1990) suggest that such “reverse” tenancy is
quite common. Balisacan (1994) attributes this to the growth of labor-intensive manufacture of
exports which has generated nonfarm employment for landless and land-poor peasants.
However, as noted in the last subsection, the pattern of who leases out land in India seems to
vary a lot from area to area. For example, in the regions studied by Birthal and Singh (1994), up
to 80 percent of the land suppliers are large landowners while Taslim and Ahmed (1993)
highlights intraclass transactions among the small.
3.2 RATIONALES AND CONSEQUENCES: ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF
LEASING FARMLAND
In this subsection, we present relevant material from the literature on the rationale behind the
choice of the type and terms of contracts and the outcomes of such choices. Specifically, we13
report here the empirical analyses that attempt to validate the various arguments made in the
theoretical literature. Robertson (1987) offers a most useful approach to organizing the
discussion in a manner conducive to subsequent policy discourse. His unique approach is to
frame his empirical work from the vantage point of asking what are the relevant decisions of
each party to a contract: “The matrix represents the widest possible range of matters known to
me on which sharecropping partners might have to agree.” With some change of order, the
subheadings below are the elements of his matrix. We have also added a subheading on policy
distortions because it is clear that the choices of landlords and tenants and the consequences are
affected significantly by government interventions.
3.2.1 Inputs
3.2.1.1 Input use intensity
The theoretical literature suggests that the incentive structure of contracts implies that farmers
will apply inputs less intensively under share tenancy than under owner cultivation. This is
particularly so for the input “effort.” Shirking of effort could be even more pronounced under
pure wage contracts if there is inadequate supervision. However, several authors report that there
is no significant difference in levels of input use across tenancy types in the data they analyze
(e.g., Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Fukui 1997; and Yokoyama 1995).
It is suggested that the lack of difference might indicate that the landlord has the ability to
monitor the application of inputs.
7 For example, this could occur when the landlord and tenant
have personal relationships or the landlord has access to information due to proximity. The
existence of these kinds of avenues for monitoring or ensuring adequate effort clearly affects
contractual choice. Sharecrop contracts are typically chosen only when supervision is feasible
(Birthal and Singh 1994).
On the other hand, Bhaumik (1991) reports (from data on several villages in India) that
tenants with both owned and sharecropped lands tend to use more inputs (of all sorts) on their
own plots. The difference is more pronounced for unrecorded tenants. The same result is not
observed for owners who rent under fixed-rent contracts. Yet, Huang (1991) indicates, albeit
with a very simple model and data analysis, that formal (recorded) tenants whose behavior is
governed by regulated prices use inputs less intensively (and, therefore, are less productive). It is
hard to discern the meaning of these results without knowing more about to whom the
regulations are actually applied and who are the subjects of concealed tenancy.
3.2.1.2 Resource access, the extent of leasing and the nature of contracts
In the literature there is much discussion of land leasing as a means of resource adjustment. In
other words, leasing is viewed as a mechanism by which persons match the amount of land they
use to the amounts of other resources, including labor, water, and animal power, at their disposal.
In this subsection, we present a panorama of such “resource adjustment” arguments. We also
mention arguments about how availability of key resources may affect the choice among the
various contractual forms.
                                               
7 It has also been suggested that in the context of subsistence farming, the plots assigned to share tenants are so small
as to make shirking a nonviable option for the farmer since such behavior would put the family at risk of falling
below subsistence.14
First, the existence of off-farm employment opportunities seems to be a factor in
determining the extent to which rural persons participate in the lease market. In the absence of
wage-labor opportunities or where wage labor is disdained (due to social and cultural norms), the
lease market is a means for adjusting the land base to an adequate land/man ratio for a family
(Skoufias 1995; Lanjouw 1995; Taslim and Ahmed 1993). Also, some authors suggest that too
few family workers available to work the land as a determinant of how much land to lease out.
Along a similar vein, minor attention in the literature is given to leasing as a solution to the
problem of fragmentation of holdings. For example, see the explanation of “reverse” leasing in
Birthal and Singh (1994).
Second, access to irrigation appears to be a major factor in the choice among tenancy
contracts. For example, Narayana and Nair (1994) indicate that in South Asia both the incidence
and form of tenancy is affected by irrigation. Specifically, they observe that the incidence of
tenancy is low when there is uncertainty regarding irrigation. Of the lease contracts arranged in
such a scenario, share tenancy is the main form due to uncertainty. Share tenancy is an effective
way of risk-sharing between landlord and tenant whereas in fixed-rent tenancy, the tenant bears
all the risk. Wijaya (1981) and Kasryno (1981), on the other hand, observe the absence of share
tenancy in his irrigated study villages in Indonesia. In that research, share tenancy was observed
in villages without irrigation. Similarly, Walker, Singh, and Ballabh (1990) suggest that in India,
in irrigated areas, the percentage of owner-cultivated land is even higher than in other areas. In
drought-prone areas, sharecropping prevails. Basu (1994) reports the same logic and makes a
parallel between sharecrop contract and limited liability clause in modern loan contracts. Ray
(1998) discusses limited liability and sharecropping.
Soil quality is another important aspect of the analysis of land leasing. Ghosh (1995)
presents a model that suggests a correlation between land quality and contract form. In particular,
he expects a correlation of the continuum from best quality land to poorest and the continuum of
tenurial arrangements from owner cultivation to share cropping to fixed-rent tenancy. Evidence
in favor of this hypothesis comes from data found in Shaban (1987) regarding India (although it
is unclear how the average per acre value of land is calculated to make the comparison). In
Yokoyama (1995), it is observed that owner-cultivated land is also more common at the other
end of the land quality distribution—marginal lands, since there is no economic basis for leasing
it out.
Finally, but not least importantly, ownership of bullocks is a major factor in explaining the
incidence of leasing, at least in India. Most authors explain that the market for bullock services is
generally absent. This stems from the peculiarity of this resource which means that if leased out,
such would conflict with the time needed on the owner’s farm and that the owners feel a need to
go with the leased bullock for fear of their mistreatment. Thus, bullock services are not easily
marketed. (Birthal and Singh 1991 and 1994; Skoufias 1995; Lanjouw 1995; and Walker, Singh.
and Ballabh 1990).
3.2.1.3 Technological change in the context of land leasing
Earlier in the paper, we discussed the impact of modernization on the choice among contractual
types. In this subsection, we discuss the issue of how the different forms of contracting for land
affect the decision about whether to adopt new technologies. Cheng (1993) presents a review of
the literature on this subtheme. His review and a reading of additional literature show that the
evidence on adoption patterns by different tenancy forms is mixed. In the extreme case, Fujimoto15
(1996) indicates that tenure status is irrelevant to the adoption decision. Farm size is the variable
that matters. Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) identify (theoretically) decreased speed of
innovation as a source of “dynamic inefficiency” of sharecropping. However, they note that this
observation does not have much empirical support.
3.2.2 Nature of contractual relationships
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the logic behind the trends characterizing land leasing
presented in subsection 3.1 of this paper. First, we ask about the nature of the contracting parties.
Two key questions about the nature of the landlord/tenant relationship include the following: (a)
Does exploitation exist? and, (b) Is there an advantage to familiarity (kin, friends, community)?
The interested reader can find an organized and comprehensive discussion of these themes in
Patnaik (1994). Patnaik creates a matrix according to the agrarian class of landlords and that of
tenants. In this subsection, we also briefly report the explanations found regarding the terms of
contracts.
With regard to exploitation, it should be apparent from the information presented thus far in
this paper that in the context of Asia, while there is some incidence of the rich lord exploiting the
labor of very poor tenants, there are far more examples of intraclass leasing (particularly in
Southeast Asia and in East Asia). A gray area arises in the context of reverse leasing. In such
cases, the landlord does not exploit the tenant. On the other hand, cases of “pawning” would
seem to open the possibility of exploitative behavior of the tenant with regard to the credit side of
the transaction. Little work is available which tries to compare rates of interest on such “loans.”
The subject of whether there is an advantage to familiarity is the focus of analysis of
Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Fukui (1997). They assert that personal relations are “important to
reduce moral hazards and provide a commitment device when intertemporal resource transfers
are involved; among kin there is an incentive to cooperate rather than shirk because kin offer
insurance in case of various eventualities” (Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Fukui 1997, p. 396). They
offer empirical evidence that supports the view that sharecropping is efficient and mention that
most of the contracts are made among family members within the sample being analyzed. Their
data indicate that nonkin sharecroppers use less inputs on average and are significantly affected
by the terms of the contract. In other words, the advantage to kin-based relations, and more
generally relations among persons with personal ties, is greater productivity due to the ability to
ensure that adequate effort is made. This is also discussed in Wijaya (1981). Based on a broad
reading of the empirical literature, Balisacan (1994) very strongly suggests that such advantage is
present.
Yokoyama (1995) presents some interesting data showing that there is an age factor in
distinguishing the lessor (average age 52) and the lessee (average age of pure tenant is 31), while
the owner-cum-tenant is in between. He uses this as evidence of the agricultural ladder. Along
the same line, Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) discuss sharecropping as a step in the
inheritance process and plausibly a means to the agricultural ladder. They note that often,
unfortunately, institutional barriers such as the caste system prevent one from climbing the
ladder.16
 3.2.3 Transactions costs
 Skoufias (1995) offers statistical evidence that “...there seem to be significant transaction costs
associated with land leasing.” These include costs of obtaining information, negotiation and
communications, searching for and evaluating tenants, and monitoring and enforcing contractual
agreements. Robertson (1987), taking from Cheung, states that the “…costs of negotiation,
management, supervision, or enforcement vary across contractual forms.” These transactions
costs also vary significantly from locale to locale. Robertson provides several interesting
anecdotes focusing on the costs of arriving at and terminating a contract.
In his discussion, Robertson (1987) makes the point that “trust” defrays some transactions
costs. One might expect this from our discussion of kinship between contract parties. Robertson,
however, notes that kinship relations often bring hidden transactions costs, at least from the eyes
of the unaware scientist, such as the required hosting of extravagant feasts after the harvest. He
suggests that formalizing contracts does not necessarily reduce transactions costs, rather just
changes the nature of them. Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) observes that the use of long-
term contracts and/or interlinked contracts can, in theory, significantly reduce transactions costs.
3.2.4 Associated or interlinked contracts
Associated or interlinked contracts are those arrangements in which the parties agree to
contractual terms regarding participation in more than one market, for example, land, credit,
labor, output marketing. All of the papers mentioned in this short subsection include a review of
prior conceptual and theoretical models of the key points that they make. Perhaps the most
general and inclusive reviews of this subtheme are found in Cheng (1993) and in Taslim and
Ahmed (1993). The review provided in Carter and Kanel (1992) explains participation in
interlinked contracts very succinctly: “Those individuals who are locked into a system of multiple
relations have market opportunities. Those who are not have no opportunity to make an isolated
transaction in a single market.
8”
Among the more specific explanations of market interlinkage, the following three are most
relevant in the context of this paper. First, interlinkage is explained as a response to risk and
information asymmetry (Teh 1991). For example, the landlord might try to induce efficient labor
effort by also being a lender to his tenants. Second, more generally, imperfections in capital
markets explain this type of interlinkage. Both landlord-lenders (Birthal and Singh 1994; Gautam
1995; Khasnabis 1994) and tenant-lenders are observed (Wijaya 1981; Kasryno 1981; Taslim
and Ahmed 1993; and Robertson 1987). The later group is more common in Southeast Asia and
includes such arrangements as land pawning and mortgaging. Finally, several authors suggest
that cost-sharing arrangements under sharecrop tenancy are a mechanism for obtaining working
capital or a credit market substitute (see the review in Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami 1992).
Despite the theoretical appeal of these explanations, some authors suggest that such interlinked
contracts are not particularly common in practice, for example, Walker, Singh, and Ballabh
(1990) in their study of five villages in India.
                                               
8 One reviewer of this text suggests that the view articulated by Carter and Kanel might be a special case. More
commonly, it is suggested, interlinked contracts lead to dependence. Multiple relations are highly disliked by tenants.
While a single relationship can be terminated, several with the same person usually cannot. Ending one relationship,
for instance, tenancy, requires ending all others as well (credit, labor, etc.). This is beyond the ability of a poor tenant.17
3.2.5 Output
Output is the end to which the land-lease contract is a means. Thus, Robertson (1987) suggests
that inquiry should be made about which crops are associated with which types of contracts (see
previous discussion) and about how yields compare across contract forms. This short subsection
summarizes the sizable literature on comparative yields. There are basically two camps: (1) those
authors who find no significant yield disadvantage to sharecropping (e.g., Sadoulet, de Janvry,
and Fukui 1997; Yokoyama 1995); and (2) those who find sharecropping less productive than
owner-cultivation (e.g., Pal 1992; Walker, Singh, and Ballabh 1990).
Lieten (1996) lists many articles that support either of these views and indicates that today
the debate remains intense. He sides clearly with the evidence that in some places, West Bengal,
for example, tenancy reforms which give more security and less risk to the tenant are associated
with a big increase in productivity. However, he warns against assuming causality because at the
same time, irrigation was introduced and credit extended. We already mentioned the problem of
sorting out the impact of tenure versus other aspects of agrarian reforms in subsection 3.1.1.
Noting that the bulk of the empirical studies find no significant productivity gap, Otsuka, Chuma,
and Hayami (1992) suggest that the authors fail to disprove efficiency differences either.
Specifically, they point to methodological flaws that render comparative yield studies a poor
basis to evaluate hypotheses regarding comparative efficiency of production under various types
of contracts.
3.2.6 Policy distortions
As mentioned in the introduction to this part of the paper, a discussion of the rationale behind
observed behaviors would not be complete without a discussion of the impacts of legislation
regulating lease markets. In all of the nations discussed in this paper, government intervention in
land markets was a prominent aspect of rural policy. Typically, the government enacted agrarian
reform legislation that imposed a ceiling on landholdings (often both owned and leased) and the
transfer of land above the ceiling to land-poor persons.
In Asia, agrarian reform legislation was often coupled with tenancy reform legislation.
Tenancy reform typically encompassed statutory definition of quasi-permanent use-rights for
tenants with limited right of resumption for the landlord; restrictions on the type of leasehold
tenures (often banning share tenancy and, in some instances, banning leasing altogether); and
government regulation of the terms of contracts.
These legal restrictions are meant to affect the behavior of the participants in the land rental
market, but as many authors have observed, often the effect is other than that intended. In fact,
Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Fukui (1997, p. 396) suggest that “...cases of inefficiency are usually
related to policy interventions that constrain the choice of contract.” Similarly, Balisacan (1994)
observes that studies that find yield and input use inefficiency under sharecropping tend to take
data from areas where the contractual choices are legislatively restricted.
Taslim and Ahmed (1993) point out the problem of viewing markets in isolation when they
occur in the presence of de facto interlinkage of markets. Teh (1991) similarly asks how
interlinked transactions that are efficient in the context of imperfect markets will survive a major
agrarian reform plan in the Philippines. In other words, the reforms focus on the land distribution
question without redressing the problems of underdeveloped other markets (e.g., credit and18
insurance). He also reports that “land pawning emerged as a surrogate for the land market” in the
presence of legal restrictions of land sales and on land rental. A final point made by Teh is that
these restrictions on land transference reduce the collateral value of land and, hence, exacerbate
the credit access problems of the intended beneficiaries.
An even more harmful impact on intended beneficiaries occurred in India. Tenancy
regulations induced massive evictions of fixed-rent tenants (Parthasarthy 1991; Birthal and Singh
1994; Bhawan 1997). Many of these same persons then became sharecrop tenants with mainly
absentee landlords despite the fact that a pretext for eviction was a resumption of owner
cultivation. According to Bhawan (1997), such landlords generally hold land for nonagricultural
values (e.g., “store of value, a hedge against inflation, an instrument for appropriating… [the
benefits] …of huge public investments in irrigation…”). In this context, resumption and eviction
are viewed as moves to keep the landlord free from litigation and imply that leasing is conducted
in a extralegal framework. Thus, there is less security for the tenant, for example, informal,
seasonal agreement rather than longer-term contract. Bhawan (1997) further argues that
restrictions on leasing mean that small farmers who lease out land command a rent less than the
real market value.
Hsiung (1992) describes what he considers to be long-term distortions that arose from the
land reforms in Taiwan. Among the issues he raises are the following. First, the deadlock
between landlords who wish to discontinue leases and the lessees who refuse to give them up
(the law stipulates tight conditions under which a landlord may reclaim use of his land). Second,
the unequal treatment of tenants results from the fact that not all were subject to all aspects of the
reform legislation. Third, some land lies fallow or is in unproductive uses since landlords do not
risk having to permanently cede the use-rights to their land. Finally, there is significant presence
of illegal contracting at “market” terms. One can infer from the text that land value appreciation
due to urbanization has brought the issue of landlord rights to the surface recently.
Along similar lines, Huang (1991) suggests that with urbanization of rural areas, the
problem of landlords not wanting to lease out land for fear of the implication for permanent use
rights is on the rise in Taiwan. This further constrains an already tight land market. He also
mentions that in Taiwan the rent stipulated in the legislation is a percentage of the yield based on
1949 production patterns. This very rigid regulation, he says, causes free-market rents (of land
not subject to the tenancy regulation) to be exaggerated. What might have been a “good” in the
context of Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s makes no sense in the context of a vastly improved
level of development of present-day Taiwan.
Finally, a positive side effect of legislation which imposes rent control is that it has in some
instances induced “windfall” profits for the beneficiaries. This occurs when such legislation is
implemented just before a major modernization is adopted (e.g., HYV and irrigation) inducing
vastly improved yields [e.g., Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) describe such in Central
Luzon, Philippines]. With rents fixed based on low yields, the profit margin is high.
3.3 SOME PARTICULAR AND INTERESTING CASES
In this last subsection of this literature review, some particular and interesting cases are very
briefly presented. These kinds of cases illustrate the problem of placing blanket restrictions on
rental under the paternalistic assumption that poor, land-scarce farmers are ignorant and thus19
subject to exploitation. For a clear example, Fujimoto (1996) notes the pajak contract in
Malaysia in which the tenant advances the rent for up to ten seasons—a form of credit from rich
tenant to poor land holder!
Yokoyama (1995) discusses a case study from West Java, Indonesia, in which the farm
sector is free of legal restrictions to land tenure. While farm plots, in the majority (70%), are
owner-cultivated, the evidence shows that land leasing functions as an equalizer of farm size.
This is the case mentioned earlier in the paper in which a recent switch from traditional crops to
vegetables occurred in the uplands via contract farming with middlemen. In this context, the
lease market impact on expansion of current holdings in the uplands is limited because of the
labor intensity of production limits the scale of production. However, the lease market seems to
permit an increase in access to land suitable for vegetable cultivation. Prior to vegetables there
was no leasing of land in the uplands areas. Also, the change spurred a seasonal demand for lease
of paddy land during the time when it is idle often by the middlemen who pay rent in advance.
The middlemen usually then sublease to farmers in smaller units on the condition that the
vegetables are sold through the landlord/middleman. Yokoyama argues that this is beneficial to
all parties. The farmer, for example, gains by having access to lands outside his village and the
landlord by reduced transactions costs with only one negotiation.
Finally, Wijaya (1993) describes another odd kind of “leasing” arrangement in Indonesia
called Tebasan in which the land is leased only for the harvest period. This is really a contract for
the standing crop rather than the land per se. It seems that those who market the product prefer to
control the harvest activities while the farmers gain a secure income. Typically, part is paid
preharvest based on farmer’s calculation of its value, his need for cash, and negotiation with the
“lessee” based on the lessee’s calculations of value. The rest is paid in various installment
schemes. The farmer gains access to postharvest storage and access to informal credit.
4.0 TENANCY IN LATIN AMERICA
Tenancy has been a common practice in Latin America since the colonial period. Traditionally,
tenancy arrangements were dominated by estate owners who had the political power and legal
authority to impose terms and conditions, most often to the detriment of tenant families.
For most of this century, scholars have predicted the disappearance of tenancy practices as
capitalist agriculture and wage labor would replace “old-fashioned” latifundios and haciendas
based on tenant labor. With the agrarian reform movements of the 1960s and 1970s, large estates
(which had stubbornly refused to give up their tenants) were to be replaced with peasant family
farming. More recently, the literature has recognized that while capitalist production has become
the prominent mode of production in Latin American agriculture—producing with high
technology and for a more diversified market—it utilizes not only wage labor but also adapts
tenancy arrangements to their needs and particular constraints.
Contemporary literature has also taken notice of the prevalence of tenancy among
smallholders, typically motivated by changes in the family structure as it goes through different
family life-cycle stages. In some cases, tenancy is a means for entrepreneurial or relatively
wealthier smallholders to accumulate capital and become capitalist producers within a peasant
community.20
4.1 TENANCY TRENDS
Many different tenancy arrangements have been used over the last several centuries and continue
to be used. This subsection will review these different arrangements and attempts to reveal
current tendencies in tenancy itself and its different forms.
4.1.1 Sharecropping in Latin America
Historically, in Latin America sharecropping has been used by owners of large landholdings to
put their land into production and generate income with minimal investment. As a means to
access labor, however, sharecropping adapts to different production conditions (particularly labor
costs and technology). The literature on sharecropping in Mexico, for example, shows that it still
exists in spite of land reform and the establishment of ejido land tenure. Originally it was used by
large landowners to produce on their land with little capital investment and little risk, have access
to temporary labor, clear land for cultivation, ensure against encroachment, and expand their own
landholding. Currently this type of sharecropping still occurs between small subsistence
producers who use low levels of technology and large or medium landowners. In the large estate
sector, sharecropping is also used between commercial producers who sharecrop fertile land
from large landowners using machinery and high levels of technology to produce cash crops
(Correa 1991).
Sharecropping arrangements in Latin America have been practiced between smallholder
families when they lack one or another input or resource; these are typically temporary
sharecropping agreements. And another novel sharecropping arrangement is that between
agribusiness and small landowners. These trends will be described in the following subsections.
Sharecropping in its most basic form is an agreement to produce agricultural products
whereby the landowner provides land and the tenant provides labor; at the end of the agricultural
cycle both parties divide the harvest. Most sharecropping arrangements, however, have
additional terms and conditions. These agreements differ greatly with regard to the level of
responsibility each party assumes for management and inputs, how production is divided
between the two parties, and the socioeconomic status of both parties. The discussion in the next
few subsections will consider these sets of factors and provide examples of different
sharecropping experiences.
4.1.1.1 Levels of participation by sharecropper and landowner
Considering the level of participation by each party, three general sharecropping arrangements
can be distinguished; these are simply analytical types since in practice there are many variations
and combinations along the continuum. At one extreme, the landowner gives minimal oversight
or management and no inputs other than land, while the sharecropper assumes full management
responsibility for farming and provides all inputs and labor. The tenant usually receives more
than 50 percent of the harvest. Historically in Latin America, these cases generally involved an
absentee landowner who was present at key times of production such as the harvest to supervise
the division of the production. There is, however, a recent twist on this type of sharecropping
(called reverse sharecropping) in which a capital-poor landowner, usually a smallholder,
sharecrops with a commercial farmer or agribusiness firm that assumes full managerial
responsibility.21
The other extreme is a situation in which the landowner (or his administrator) provides most
of the management, supervision, and inputs and the sharecropper provides little more than
his/her labor and that of his/her family. Usually, production in this case is a high-value cash crop
and landowners not only market their own shares of the harvest but also that of the
sharecroppers. In this case, the landowner receives more than 50 percent of production.
An in-between sharecropping arrangement is one in which both parties, landowner and
sharecropper, provide more or less equal amounts of inputs, share in the management, and divide
the production in half. Both parties are business-type partners, even though they may know each
other well and even be related. This type of sharecropping is particularly prevalent between
smallholders, although owners of medium and large estates sometimes also enter into this type of
sharecropping with wealthy peasants of family-sized holdings. In the former situation, labor
input is usually carefully divided equally between both families, whereas in the second the
landowner may provide some wage labor for peak periods.
4.1.1.2 Sharecropper and landowner relations
There are also three general types of sharecropper-landowner relationship reflecting
socioeconomic status. One type involves owners of large or medium landholdings who parcel
out their land to resource-poor sharecroppers. Landowners in this case are of a higher
socioeconomic status than sharecroppers, giving them the power to determine sharecropping
conditions such as what to grow, marketing, and division of inputs and of harvest.
Another type of relationship is that between owners of small pieces of land who are not able
to fully work them (e.g., little family labor, no capital or credit) and agricultural enterprises that
may or may not also own land. In this case, the firm provides most of the inputs and determines
the conditions, and the small landowners are either engaged in off-farm work or work as wage
laborers on their own land as well as receive a share of the harvest. In this type of reverse
sharecropping, the conditions and terms are determined by the agricultural enterprise, not the
landowner, which not only controls information and technology not available to smallholders but
is represented by persons of higher socioeconomic status.
And the third landowner-sharecropper relationship is one of socioeconomic equals: both
landowner and sharecropper are peasant families with small or family-sized holdings. They enter
into a partnership with each providing inputs including labor, selling their crops on the market,
and dividing up the harvest more or less equally. These circumstances often happen because of
family life-cycle stages; for example, an older landowner with little family labor who sharecrops
his land with a member of his/her community who has more family labor than land or has
accumulated some capital. Sometimes these sharecropping arrangements between persons of the
same social status mask economic inequality; for example, some households have access to more
land and/or inputs and consequently are in better circumstances to engage in agricultural
production than their neighbors.
4.1.1.3 Types of sharecropping arrangements
Using the two sets of factors described above, general types of sharecropping arrangements can
be identified. One reflects that fact that one party has predominant access to and control of
resources and socioeconomic power. The other occurs in the context of more or less equal access
to land and other resources as well as power by both parties. The caveat must be made, however,22
that there is much variation within these types reflecting the complex sets of conditions present
in Latin American agriculture.
Unequal sharecropping conditions
In this type of sharecropping one party controls most of the resources, has a higher
socioeconomic status, mostly determines the sharecropping conditions, and may even control
production marketing for both parties (usually to the detriment of the other party). This type is
the traditional sharecropping arrangement in Latin America, but has a new version, called
reverse sharecropping in some of the literature, that has evolved in the past several decades.
Historically, the dominant party has been the landowner of large or medium estates, but recently
there is a new player, the agribusiness firm, which is strictly speaking the sharecropper.
The other party controls very few resources and is not able to significantly influence the
terms and conditions of the sharecropping agreement and is of lower socioeconomic status. Once
again, in the past this person has typically been a landless or land-poor sharecropper and his/her
family who provide labor and perhaps some other inputs. In reverse sharecropping, the person
with less control of conditions is the landowner of a small holding who is not able to work it and
enters a sharecropping agreement with an agribusiness firm or commercial firm that provides all
inputs including labor (although the smallholder and family may be hired as seasonal wage
workers), markets all of the production, and gives the landowner a share of the net income.
An example of classic sharecropping is the introduction of yanaconaje for cotton production
and other commercial crops on the coast of Peru after the abolition of slavery and of Chinese
indentured workers. Initially sharecropping was convenient for owners of large estates because
little capital outlay was needed, risks were borne mostly by sharecropper, and sharecropper’s
family provided additional labor (contributing to low indirect labor costs, i. e., lower input costs
and higher share of harvest for landowner). This reserve of labor is particularly important for
cotton because of the high labor demand at cotton picking time. In these sharecropping
arrangements, landowners provided land, seed, oxen, and tools in exchange for a percentage of
the harvest and offered loans at high interest rates. Sharecroppers were obliged to sell their share
of their cotton harvest to the landowner at below-market prices. The conditions of sharecropping
changed over the decades of the 1900s as a result of world market demand fluctuations and
prices, struggles between landowners and sharecroppers, legislation, and technology.
Sharecropping as the dominant production practice started to decline as technology lowered
production costs and made direct cultivation by landowners profitable. It was finally dealt a
death blow when the agrarian reforms of 1962 and 1969 first gave yanaconas the opportunity to
buy the land they were working and then simply outlawed indirect agricultural production
(Matos Mar 1976; Gonzales 1991).
Traditional sharecropping (large estate owner and landless or land-poor tenant) is still
practiced in Latin America. A case in point can be found in Colombia between a smallholder or
landless family and a landowner or cash renter of an estate (Raymond 1986). These contracts
were traditionally oral and while lately there is a tendency to have written contracts, there are
complaints from sharecroppers that they are not observed. In the past, the sharecropper often had
labor obligations on the hacienda and the obligation to sell their own share of the harvest (after
the landowner’s share is paid) to the landowner or renter, often at below-market prices. The
sharecropper was allowed to grow food crops, actually was encouraged to do so, as this lowered23
the sharecropper’s living costs and allowed the landowner or renter to a larger share of the
harvest.
Sharecroppers in Colombia today are usually smallholder peasants who grow cash crops on
the sharecropped land and food crops (sometimes grown together with cash crops) on their own
land or raise livestock on their own land and food crops on the sharecropped land.
9 It is no longer
common for sharecroppers to have labor obligations on the hacienda. Labor costs (reflected in
how production is divided) are kept low particularly since the sharecropper’s family also works
on the parcel and grows their own food. Sharecropping is also preferred for the growing of
nontraditional cash crops (such as pineapple, fresh beans, and tomato), allowing the landowner to
share the risks of growing new crops with the sharecropper.
Chile offers a different example of this type sharecropping (Durán 1985; Rivera 1987). The
context is one in which (1) owners of medium and smallish estates do not have the sufficient
capital or credit to purchase inputs, tools, and to pay for wage labor, (2) cash crops
10 are high risk
(high labor needs and low or fluctuating prices), and (3) minifundistas or landless peasants do not
have enough land for their own subsistence but do have labor to sell. These landless and land-
poor families do not have capital for renting in land (cash rents are normally paid in advance,
whereas sharecropping “rents” are paid after harvest). The advantage for both landowner and
sharecropper is that a minimum of cash (for either hiring wage labor or paying cash rent) is
needed. Landowners supply some inputs in addition to the land and sharecroppers put up the
balance of inputs, including wage labor in addition to their own family labor. In the Central
Valley Chilean case, sharecropping is increasing as the result of decapitalization of traditional
landowners, increase of small landowners but without capital, low prices for crops, and an
increasing number of minifundios.
11
This type of traditional sharecropping has responded to changing conditions, including
sociopolitical pressures. In Colombia, sharecroppers on coffee plantations (called tabloneros)
cultivated, cared for, and harvested coffee trees. Sharecropping assured a labor force for harvest
while providing supervision (exercised by the sharecroppers themselves). When sharecroppers
threatened to exercise property rights over the land during the 1930s, landowners took over part
of the coffee-tree maintenance on the sharecroppers’ parcels and eventually converted tabloneros
into contract producers who were paid a weekly wage for their work on the parcel (where they
also lived). The hacienda now buys the crop and pays the contratista according to a price fixed at
the beginning of the agricultural cycle after deducting weekly wages. The hacienda provides all
other inputs and services other than labor and exercises constant supervision (Anrup 1990).
These contract producers appear to combine characteristics of both wage workers and
sharecroppers.
We have seen up to now “unequal” sharecropping between owners of large and medium
landholdings and landless or land-poor peasants. Another type of “unequal” sharecropping is that
                                               
9 In Santander, for example, 83% of bean production, 81% of sugarcane, and 68% of tobacco is grown by
sharecroppers. For some crops in this area (such as sugarcane), landowners prefer sharecropping because it shifts part
of the risks associated with these crops such as price fluctuations to the sharecropper and requires minimal
investment on the part of the landowner.
10 In this Chilean case, these are usually food crops for regional and national markets, not export or industrial crops.
11 Where crops for agroindustry are grown, either the land is cash rented or the owner works the land directly using
wage labor.24
between landowners who have very restricted access to resources and enter contracts with
sharecroppers who can provide these resources (called reverse sharecropping). Sharecropping
between agrarian reform beneficiary groups and what appear to be agricultural wholesalers are
found in Honduras. Cruz and Muñoz (1997) report groups of agrarian reform beneficiaries that
put up land and labor and commercial firms providing capital and other inputs. In this particular
study, 38 percent of beneficiary groups’ land was being sharecropped in this manner. In Brazil,
where no agrarian reform occurred, smallholders who cannot obtain credit or afford to buy
machinery themselves live and work on their own farm and share a percentage of the crop with a
mechanized operator who prepares, cultivates, and harvests (Muller 1988). Reverse
sharecropping is not very common as these types of reverse tenancy are more commonly cash
rentals.
Sharecropping between equals
The other type of sharecropping arrangement is one in which both parties invest more or less
equally in the production process and occupy the same socioeconomic status. This is typically
the case of smallholder households who pool resources when one of them lacks sufficient
household labor and capital to provide inputs for production on their land and the other
smallholder household that has more inputs and capital than it is able to use on its own holding.
In this type of sharecropping, production has usually been for subsistence food production, but
has increasingly also been used for production of cash crops.
A number of studies undertaken in the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Andean region provide
examples of sharecropping among peasant families for the production of cash crops (Glave
Testino 1992; Urrutia 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Lehmann 1986). These peasant families are typically
smallholders and the dominant commercial crop is high-yield variety potato sold on local and
regional markets. These varieties need significant amounts of commercial inputs—high-yield
seeds, fertilizer, and insecticides. They also need much labor. In addition, potato is a risky crop
because of highly fluctuating prices
12 and climate/pests/disease problems. Climate risk can be
reduced if producers cultivate on different parcels at different altitudes and microclimates.
Not uncommonly, some families have access to some capital and need more land to
cultivate while other families have land and labor but not the capital to produce commercial
crops. Lehmann (1986) maintains that sharecropping under these conditions permits producers to
diversify price risk in time and climate risk in space. The major characteristics of producers and
production are: (1) smallholder peasant families
13 within a community, (2) with more or less
equal access to resources; (3) a commercial crop that has high input costs and high labor needs;
(4) scarcity of credit for smallholders; and (5) high use of wage labor for peak periods. Both
landowner and sharecropper contribute family labor calculated as an labor-input cost—but also
hire landless and smallholder peasants for peak periods.
Sharecropping production in this case may be characterized as a capitalist enterprise—the
landowner’s claim to land rent is forgone and both tenant and landowner are seen as business
                                               
12 Potato is difficult to store and is therefore usually marketed soon after harvest; an unusually good or bad harvest
can therefore significantly affect prices.
13 In Peru many of the smallholders received land from the 1969 agrarian reform while in Ecuador smallholders more
often purchased land when estate owners were divesting themselves of some of their holdings in anticipation fear of
pending agrarian reform.25
partners with each contributing inputs and sharing production output more or less equally. Also,
contracts are usually for just one crop cycle or two—not long-term. However, there are
differences among sharecropping arrangements, even among community members. The most
egalitarian arrangements are among those with larger extensions of land, and the less egalitarian
among families with relatively unequal landholdings. Extreme cases of the latter kind may
actually be hybrid cases of sharecropping and reverse leasing: landowning but poor peasant
families who have no capital and are net sellers of labor sharecrop with wealthier peasants who
have access to capital and are net buyers of labor. The poorer peasant family contributes land,
labor, and supervision of his/her family labor while the relatively wealthier peasant family
contributes inputs (high-yield variety seeds, fertilizer, pesticides) and management.
This latter type of sharecropping among families of the same social status can sometimes
result in differentiation within the community. Peasants (such as those with more access to
resources, whether private or communal, and capital) are able to accumulate capital and
resources while others, land-poor and minifundista families become increasingly poorer, remain
relatively poor. In fact, landless families were found to seldom enter into sharecropping contracts
with other peasant producers. This type of sharecropping among peasant households is seen by
Lehmann (1986) as a transition to capitalist farming by allowing some peasant producers to buy
the labor of other peasants under conditions where there is not a large wage-labor force, factor
markets particularly for credit are imperfect, and producers are more or less equal (i.e., none are
owners of large estates with political, social, and economic power).
“Equal” sharecropping can also occur between parties of high socioeconomic status. In
Colombia, compañía is a form of sharecropping between more or less social equals. Until rather
recently, the two parties consisted of the owner of a hacienda and a sharecropper with some
economic means; written contracts are the norm. The sharecropper rents in the whole hacienda
(or a significant part of it) with its house and buildings for a period of one to nine years, and both
the tenant and the landowner share costs of production and harvesting and then split the harvest
of the main cash crop (usually coffee and sugarcane). Any crops grown in between coffee trees,
for example, belong entirely to the sharecropper. The sharecropper often hires subsharecroppers
to farm the land. The frequency of this type of sharecropping has been declining and compañía is
now more commonly between middle-sized landowners or wealthy peasant families and landless
or minifundio peasants (Raymond 1986).
4.1.2 Fixed rent: cash and in-kind
Fixed cash or in-kind renting of land has typically taken place between absentee landlords who
rent out their whole estate or a large portion of it to a commercial farmer. The latter in turn often
inherits the labor practices of the hacienda—sharecropping, labor tenancy, small-scale rentals, or
wage labor. Fixed rentals have also been common among smallholders. More recently, another
kind of rental is coming into play: the renting out of land by smallholders to agribusiness
enterprises. As we saw in the subsection on sharecropping, this is sometimes called reverse
leasing.
Raymond (1986) describes the course of fixed cash renting in Colombia since the early
1900s. Fixed rent contracts between landowners and commercial farmers became common after
the 1910s and replaced direct production by landowners using wage labor when wages became
too costly (because of a more stable monetary system and reduced inflation). Rental
arrangements were first used in sugarcane, tobacco, and cotton. A commercial farmer rented an26
entire hacienda (or large portion of) from the estate owner. A written contract was drawn up
where the renter agreed to pay a certain cash amount and to give back the estate in good, or at
least in the same, condition as when she/he took it over. These contracts were usually for one to
nine years. Recently, cash renting of land for crop or tree cultivation has been declining
(landowners prefer to run their own haciendas using salaried managers) and rental contracts
generally involve pasturelands for livestock raising.
Fixed in-kind rentals have also been used, most often between landowners (or their
administrators) and small tenants. In-kind renting was used in coastal Ecuador
14 during the 1950s
and 1960s for rice production (Redclift 1978) and on the Peruvian coast for cotton production
(Gonzales 1991). Tenants provided all inputs (except land): seed, fertilizer, labor including wage
labor for harvest, tools, draught animals, and paid a fixed amount per hectare rented (in Ecuador,
normally 10% of harvest). Often these inputs were financed by obtaining credit from commercial
houses, the landlord, and rice-mill and cotton-gin owners at high interest rates. In Peru, the renter
was also obliged to work on maintenance tasks of the hacienda (such as cleaning and repair of
irrigation canals, repair and maintenance of roads and bridges). In both cases, tenants were
obligated to sell their harvest to the landowner, often at below-market prices. Rice-mill owners
and cotton-gin owners were also often landowners. Landlords, therefore, monopolized the
commercialization of tenants’ crops. This type of rental was outlawed in Peru with the 1969
agrarian reform and in Ecuador in 1970.
In São Paulo, Brazil, fixed in-kind rentals are used by landowners who do not want to work
the land themselves, in spite of low-interest rates for agricultural production. They rent out their
land to trusted and well-knows persons from the area for production of agro-industrial crops such
as cotton, soybeans, and corn (Dulley and Santos 1991).
The renting in and out of parcels among smallholders is also quite common. Pérez (1992)
documents this type of rental among parceleros
15 who produce cash or commercial crops on
irrigated land on the coast of Peru. Typically, wealthier parceleros rent land from those who
cannot farm their own land (e.g., not enough family labor or credit/capital). In this community,
all landholders both contract in temporary wage labor and also work as wage laborers for other
families.
Reverse leasing is a growing tenancy arrangement as smallholders find it more and more
difficult to participate independently in commercial farming. The next subsection will focus on
this recent trend.
4.1.3 Reverse leasing
Reverse leasing is becoming prevalent in Latin America as smallholders find that they cannot
purchase the expensive inputs that cash cropping involves. This is particularly true in the case of
high-yield variety crops that require not only the purchase of significant amounts of fertilizer,
pesticides, and weed-control products, but also intensive labor and optimum conditions such as
                                               
14 In Ecuador, this particular type of tenancy arrangement was called precarismo.
15 Parceleros in the Peruvian context are ex-members of agricultural production cooperatives. These production
cooperatives were formed in the early 1970s as a result of the agrarian reform in order to keep large commercial
estates as large production units. When cooperative land was parcelized among the members in the mid-1980s, the
parcelero families on the coast received, in most cases, viable agricultural parcels with irrigation.27
abundant and controlled amounts of water (in other words, irrigation systems for most areas).
Contributing factors are imperfect markets, particularly the capital market, and lack of crop
insurance which make this type of cash crop production too risky for smallholders.
Mexican ejidatarios are smallholder families that have secure usufruct rights to land
adjudicated to the ejido community under land reform legislation.
16 Typically, they have no
capital and little access to credit. While until recently renting ejido land was illegal, rentals have
been occurring for decades. In fertile agricultural areas, ejidatarios have been renting out their
parcels to agricultural firms that bring in capital, machinery, and other inputs to produce a cash
crop. These agribusiness ventures are able to consolidate many ejido plots into one medium-
sized parcel. Often, the ejidatarios work as wage laborers on the land they have rented out. For
the ejidatario family there are distinct advantages: it receives cash rent (avoiding the risk of
farming directly) and earns wage income. Less common is renting in by fellow ejidatarios who
are able to accumulate capital and buy or rent machinery.
A number of studies in Michoacán (Barbosa and Maturana 1972; Restrepo and Sánchez
Cortés 1970a, 1970b, 1972) found that cotton agricultural firms started renting both ejido land
and privately owned land in the 1950s. Not only were these firms able to get around legal
obstacle that prohibits renting of ejido land, they were also able to take advantage of state credit
programs supposedly destined for ejidatarios. The cotton companies would consolidate small
parcels into medium-sized extensions of land (30–50 hectares). The number of ejidatarios that
rented out their land increased over the 1960s and 1970s as the amount of state credit for ejido
land decreased. Reverse leasing was also found in the Bajío region located on the central plateau.
Land is rented from ejidatarios on irrigated land to produce wheat and sorghum using machinery
and other inputs (Roberts 1995). In both regions, the great majority of the renters of land are
from outside the region; very few ejidatarios are among the renters. Written contracts are the
norm and any improvements done on the ejido parcel by the renter is deducted from the rent paid
to the ejidatario.
What is clear from these studies is that those who rent in land are persons with enough
access to capital to invest in cash crops while those who rent out (the ejidatarios) do not have
access to such capital for cash crops and are able to grow only subsistence crops such as maize
and beans. Since a good ejido parcel (good soil, access to water, access to transport) can be
rented out at a good price, more than the income ejidatarios can get working it themselves with
no credit, it has been advantageous to rent out their land and find wage work for themselves,
either on their own land or off the farm. Other expected benefits that were touted by advocates
for these renting arrangements such as exposure to and adoption of new technology, agricultural
practices, and capitalization of the land have not occurred. Barbosa and Maturana (1972) found
that there has been increasing production and technological disparities between the ejidatarios
and those who rented in their ejido land
Cases of reverse leasing are also found in Central America among agrarian reform
beneficiary groups that cannot work the land they have received because they lack capital to
purchase inputs, machinery, and technical assistance. In almost all cases, renting of agrarian
reform land is illegal. These family-sized parcels are rented out to mostly agro-industrial
companies that grow cash crops (e.g., sugarcane, soybeans, rice, melons) and hire the
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beneficiaries as wage workers. In one study in Honduras, 40 percent of the beneficiary groups’
land was rented out (Cruz and Muñoz 1997). Another study in Costa Rica found that fertile but
flooded lands belonging to agrarian reform beneficiaries were rented out to owners of large
estates who have access to capital and modern technological knowledge. In this particular case,
these better-endowed farmers were able to use these flooded lands because of their access to
credit, machinery, and technology for profitable cash crops such as sugarcane and rice, lands that
the smallholders could not profitably farm. Another incentive for renting out is the fact that
beneficiaries are reluctant to take on more debt for land improvement in addition to the debt of
paying for the land they have received from agrarian reform programs (Edelman 1993).
4.1.4 Labor tenancy
Labor tenancy is often seen as the most retrograde of tenancy and labor arrangements, replaced
in time with sharecropping, cash rentals, and wage labor. A look at historical trends, however,
shows that development of agricultural production systems is not unilinear. Sadoulet (1992)
describes labor tenancy as “simultaneously a tenancy contract aimed at overcoming problems of
incentives, non-marketed factors, and insurance and a case of interlinkage of land and labor
transactions that emerge in response to the risk of default on rent payment.” Thus, it is not
unusual to find wage labor, sharecropping, and even cash renting being discarded by estate
owners for labor tenancy arrangements, particularly when landowners prefer to directly work
their land but do not want to pay cash wages.
While labor tenancy is no longer as prevalent as it once was on Latin American haciendas
and fazendas, a consideration of how labor tenancy arrangements has come into and out of use is
helpful for understanding how labor and land tenure conditions respond to changes in
agriculture, markets, technology, and macroeconomic policies. Two examples of “reversion” to
labor tenancy, one in Chile and another in Colombia, illustrate this point.
Anrup (1990) traces the use of different labor relations on Colombian estates as coffee
production developed into a major export crop. Wage workers on estates were converted into
labor tenants during the beginning of the coffee boom in the early 1900s. Coffee production is
labor intensive at crucial times during coffee bean maturation; having labor tenants and their
families on the estate created a reserve of labor that could be mobilized when needed without
keeping a permanent wage labor force.
Labor tenants were also used for sugarcane production in Colombia (Raymond 1986).
Vivientes were typically landless peasant families who lived on the hacienda and had a small plot
to cultivate their own food crops. In return, the viviente and family worked on the hacienda land
and house (domestic work) for a determined amount of days. In addition, the viviente and family
were obliged to work for the landowner whenever asked and usually a token wage was paid.
Often family members, particularly women, were not paid the same salary as other wage
workers. Over the decades, vivientes often asked for sharecropping land from the landowner; for
landless peasants, this was one way to gain access to land.
Today, the viviente system is in decline and labor obligations are seldom required.
Replacing vivientes is a small wage labor force on the hacienda and smallholder peasants who
live around the hacienda and work on it at peak labor periods. One reason for the decline of the29
viviente system has been a series of legislation
17 which gives the viviente certain rights such as a
minimum size of cropland (more or less 0.5 hectare), unrestricted use of this land (e.g., planting
of coffee trees, not just food crops), no obligation to give part of the harvest to the landowner,
and compensation for improvements on the land. These rights have strengthened the vivientes’
rights over the little land they possess; as a result landowners have been reluctant to continue
with this labor tenancy system and prefer to have sharecroppers since their contracts are more
easily terminated.
Chile also experienced a transformation of sharecroppers and cash renters into labor tenants
as wheat production replaced livestock production during the 1800s and became a major export
crop (Sadoulet 1992). Estate owners saw their land increase in value but could not charge their
tenants the high rents that this increased value implied. Landowners replaced sharecropping and
cash rental arrangements with labor tenancy. This brought the land back under direct control of
the landowner and assured them of a labor force when needed. Labor tenancy in Chile remained
basically the same until the late 1960s when labor laws obliged estate owners to pay their labor
tenants the full minimum wage in cash.
4.1.5 Contract farming
While contract farming is not strictly a tenancy arrangement, it often results from inability or
unwillingness on the part of agribusiness and highly commercial farmers to access land directly
by either purchase or leasing. It can be considered, therefore, an alternative to leasing (or
purchasing) land under certain conditions. As has been implied, contract farming has many
similarities to reverse leasing and also appears to be on the rise in Latin America as an
agricultural production system. While contract farming is used for highly commercial crops, it is
occurring under different conditions.
Briefly described, contract farming involves smallholder families (and sometimes owners of
medium-sized estates) who enter into contracts with agricultural firms to produce a particular
crop under very specific conditions. The landowner provides land, labor, and management; the
agricultural firm provides cash advances and some inputs on credit. The firm purchases the crop
from the landowner at a price fixed by the firm, discounting the advances and credit. The firm
does not lease the land from the smallholder; it just contracts for a particular crop with specific
qualities at a fixed price.
Collins (1991) encountered contract farming on irrigated land in northeastern Brazil in the
production of high-quality and labor-intensive crops. This area of Brazil is a highly productive
agricultural area with optimal climatic and water conditions. Processing firms and export
companies prefer contract farming agreements with smallholder families in order to avoid wage
labor problems and farming risks. The landowning family invests its own family labor but also
needs to hire seasonal wage labor. In some cases, part of the land is sharecropped out to another
family. In this particular Brazilian case, contractors specify the time period for planting and
harvesting, the inputs to be used, and the dates for crop delivery and payment, and set quality
standards with corresponding price differentials.
Contract farming on agrarian reform land is also occurring. In Honduras, Cruz and Muñoz
(1997) found that beneficiaries lacking capital and credit enter into contracts with agro-industrial
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and agricultural export firms that provide them with cash credit and inputs on credit. In this study
area of Honduras, 50 percent of beneficiary group’s land was in contract farming.
Contract farming also occurs at smaller, less ambitious scales with wholesalers, for example.
Urrutia (1996a, 1996b, 1997) found potato wholesalers contracting with smallholder families in
the Peruvian highlands for commercial potato crops. Commercial potato requires large quantities
of commercial inputs such as chemical fertilizer and insecticides and much labor; often
smallholder families do not have the capital for these inputs. Wholesalers supply the inputs and
some cash on credit and buy the entire crop at prices fixed by them.
The great advantage of contract farming for the contractor is that the firm obtains
agricultural products with specific qualities without the risks of managing and paying wage labor
and paying land rental. In other words, they are able to access land and labor at low
administrative costs.
4.2 RATIONALE FOR TENANCY ARRANGEMENTS
An understanding of tenancy in Latin America depends on an examination of two issues: why
landowners prefer tenancy arrangements to direct production, and why some forms of tenancy
are preferred over others. Some explanations to these two queries are clearly evident in the
literature while others are implied or hinted. This subsection will also look at the impact of past
policies on tenancy practices.
4.2.1 Tenancy versus direct production by landowner
In Latin America until recently, the debate on tenancy has been around the existence of tenancy
itself and why it (particularly sharecropping) has not been replaced by wage labor, rather than on
why more “modern” forms of tenancy such as fixed-cash rental have not replaced “backward”
ones such as sharecropping. This debate has largely focused on tenancy labor on large and
medium estates, but, as we saw in the discussion on tenancy trends, tenancy is also practiced
among smallholders. First we will examine the rationale for tenancy on large estates and then
tenancy as practiced by smallholders.
4.2.1.1 Tenancy on estate holdings
Landowners have always employed workers on their estates, but the problems associated with
wage labor have made tenancy a more attractive alternative. These problems include labor
shortage (e.g., after slavery was abolished or where a landless rural population was scarce) and
high labor costs. Some authors (Raymond 1986) maintain that market and technological
conditions for wage labor were not present or were not cost-effective. These conditions include a
developed wage labor market,
18 such that wage labor costs are low, and a production system that
requires minimal labor supervision.
A study of maize production on poor-quality and rain-fed land in Mexico in the late 1800s
to early 1900s, when labor costs were high and harvesting machines for corn were not available,
                                               
18 A developed wage-labor market implies a sizeable wage labor force and a consumer-goods market for wage
workers. Landlords have sometime obviated the absence of these conditions by recruiting labor from other areas and
by providing workers with consumer goods (often at admittedly exorbitant prices).31
found that sharecropping increased production levels in general over direct cultivation by
landowners using wage labor. In addition, landowners received a significant share of maize at a
greatly reduced cost per unit, in large part because the sharecropper invested all labor, including
family labor, at low rates (Miller 1995).
Bettis (1979) found that landowners in northeast Brazil who use sharecroppers are allocative
efficient compared to owner-cultivators who use family and wage labor; share tenancy reduces
income-risk of landowners and alleviates seasonal shortages of temporary labor, particularly
during harvest. This study also revealed that the sharecropper contract includes working on the
landowners’ crops for a wage lower than hired labor wage rate. For these reasons, landowners
have preferred tenancy labor.
But not only have estate owners preferred tenancy, tenants themselves found tenancy
preferable to wage labor, and in the past estate owners who have attempted to introduce wage
labor have encountered resistance. Martínez-Alier (1974) cites such a case in highland livestock
production in Peru, when a progressive landowner attempting to replace tenancy with wage labor
was thwarted by tenants’ preference to retain their own herds and refusal to relinquish access to
hacienda pastureland.
Tenancy also provides a mechanism for sharing between landowner and producer the risks
of agricultural production such as poor weather, market changes, and infestations. This is
particularly important in the absence of crop insurance. These risks, however, are not always
shared evenly. Fixed-cash and in-kind rentals are the least risky for landowners while
sharecropping involves a more equal sharing of risk for both parties.
Biserra (1980) and Ferreira (1980) found that both landowners and sharecroppers in
northeast Brazil sought to maximize income and reduce risk. For landowners particularly,
sharecropping both reduced and diversified risk and increased their income. Sharecropping also
increased the amount of land cultivated. Their studies also found that variations in credit
availability and interest rates did not greatly affect landowners’ decision.
In the last few decades, in part because of agrarian reform and tenancy legislation, owners of
medium and large estates have increasingly been turning to extensive agriculture employing few
permanent workers, thus reducing labor and supervision costs. Other conditions that make wage
labor a viable labor option are technology for certain crops (particularly machinery), accessible
input markets, and a market for cash crops. For example, in southern Brazil the introduction of
extensive production (livestock instead of crops) and mechanized agriculture to produce cash
crops has replaced labor tenancy with direct owner production using a small wage-labor force
(Neal 1988). In this case, an accompanying phenomenon is increased landownership
concentration as small landowners are being bought out by large landowners.
The possibility of extensive agriculture with high capital input and a small wage labor force,
however, is circumscribed by conditions specific to agriculture itself (such as risk) and to
prevailing conditions (such as available technology and access to capital). Therefore, in spite of
(a) past legislation and reforms which have made tenancy less attractive for estate owners, and
(b) land redistribution programs that have decreased landownership concentration, tenancy is still
widely utilized by both large and small producers because of market imperfections that make
wages (among other inputs) too costly, volatile product market prices, and lack of capital or
credit.32
Sharecropping is also preferred to wage labor for crops that need skilled and careful
treatment such as tobacco in Colombia (Salazar 1982) and grapes in Brazil (Collins 1991)—the
sharecropper not only puts in better quality of work but family members also work; these
sharecroppers are peasants with very little land who sharecrop with larger landholders. Since
there is only one buyer, the landowner markets the entire harvest and gives the sharecropper
his/her share after deducting any credit and/or inputs advanced.
In addition, under certain conditions it appears that sharecropping is no less productive than
direct production. One study that looked at use of technical assistance, biological and
mechanized technology, and credit among both sharecroppers (who cultivate corn) and medium
landowners (who cultivate coffee, milk, and pork) found that in spite of sharecroppers’
significantly reduced access to and use of these factors, their productivity was significantly
higher than that of the landowners (Coutinho Filho et al. 1982).
4.2.1.2  Tenancy between smallholders
Tenancy among smallholder households typically occurs when one of them lacks sufficient
family labor and capital to provide inputs for production on their land and the other smallholder
household has more inputs and capital than it is able to use on its own holding. Tenancy,
particularly sharecropping, permits these households to pool resources. Traditionally,
sharecropping was used for subsistence food production, but increasingly smallholders are using
both sharecropping and cash rental for production of commercial crops.
Typically, these smallholders engage in both direct production and tenancy, providing
family labor, hiring in labor during peak periods, and often even hiring themselves out as
seasonal labor. Lehmann (1986) maintains that sharecropping, for example, under these
conditions permits producers to diversify price risk in time and climate risk in space.
For smallholders, sharecropping may also generate more income than off-farm wage labor.
A study in southern Brazil (Alvarenga and Oliveira 1991) found that productivity of
sharecroppers and owner-sharecroppers, in terms of production value per person/day of labor, is
higher than wage rates. Major crops among these smallholders are rice, corn, and beans; smaller
producers cultivated mainly for subsistence. While production values per planted hectare were
not significantly different among producer categories (sharecropper, owner, owner-
sharecropper), sharecroppers tended to have higher productivity than small landowners.
4.2.1.3 Reverse tenancy
As we already discussed, smallholders who have very restricted access to resources also enter
into contracts with “tenants” who can provide these resources. Reverse leasing is becoming
prevalent in Latin America as smallholders find that they cannot purchase the expensive inputs
that cash cropping involves and turn to agribusiness enterprises or wholesalers. Muller (1988),
for example, found that in southern Brazil mechanization led to reverse sharecropping.
Reverse tenancy among smallholders is particularly true in the case of high-yield variety
crops that require not only the purchase of significant amounts of fertilizer, pesticides, and weed-
control products, but also intensive labor and optimum conditions such as abundant and
controlled amounts of water (in other words, irrigation systems for most areas). Contributing
factors are imperfect markets, particularly the capital market, and lack of crop insurance which
make this type of cash crop production too risky for smallholders.33
It appears from the literature that reverse tenancy is particularly prevalent among agrarian
reform beneficiaries. Explanations for the apparent high frequency of reverse tenancy among
beneficiaries include agrarian reform debts that many beneficiaries assume when they receive the
land and their low level of savings and constrained access to credit and capital.
4.2.2 Sharecropping versus fixed rental
Certain tenancy arrangements such as sharecropping and labor tenancy have been attractive to
landowners because inherent labor costs are kept below subsistence levels: not only does the
tenant and family work on the landowner’s land, the tenant family also produces most of its own
food and other subsistence needs. Sharecropping is also preferred by tenants to cash rental and
by landowners to direct production for the growing of nontraditional cash crops, allowing both
landowner and tenant to share the risks of growing new crops. The advantage for both landowner
and sharecropper is that a minimum of cash (for either hiring wage labor or paying cash rent) is
needed. Landowners supply some inputs in addition to the land and sharecroppers put up the
balance of inputs, including wage labor in addition to their own family labor.
From the literature, it appears the fixed-cash rental is preferred when risk, particularly for
the tenant, is not great (in other words, crop price does not fluctuate widely, demand is steady,
and climate/pests/disease problems are minimal), when the cash crop brings in good prices, and
when the landowner has no interest in direct cultivation. A study of three peasant areas
(representing three levels of technology use: traditional, intermediate, and modern) in the
Peruvian Andes revealed that cash renting among smallholder families was prevalent in the
modern communities while sharecropping was the dominant form of tenancy in the traditional
one. One explanatory factor may be that in the modern area, since the technological level is
higher and more improved inputs are used, production risks are lower; in addition, this area has
better access to markets, thus reducing price risks (Cotlear 1989).
Sharecropping has been used and continues to be used under very different agricultural
production systems in Latin America: it has proved to be a very adaptable arrangement for
compensating for less-than-perfect production conditions. Sharecropping has been considered
less risky for landowners than wage labor production since the sharecropper assumes most of the
risk. Sharecropper families also provide seasonal wage labor for that part of the estate cultivated
directly by the owner.
But “non-capitalist” tenancy appears to be not a phenomenon of just underdeveloped market
economies (whether local or national). While labor tenancy is no longer prevalent in most of
Latin America, sharecropping as a contemporary labor arrangement is used under highly modern
commercial production conditions. In Brazil, for example, landowners on irrigated land
producing export and industrial crops prefer sharecropping to wage labor because of lower labor
supervision costs and high-risk crops, or because crop production needs high-quality and artisan-
type labor (Silva et al. 1989). Sharecropping continues to be used throughout Latin America,
providing a flexible form of labor that disappears and is recreated according to production
conditions.
4.2.3 Impact of past policies
A significant and historically recent development in Latin American agricultural policy has been
the recognition of tenants’ rights and the passing of legislation to protect those rights since the34
1930s. A mid-1960s FAO study on tenancy (Abensour and Moral-López 1966) focused on
legislation in many countries including a large number in the Latin American region. This
publication discussed trends in tenancy legislation pointing out that legislation in Latin America
was guided by social concerns rather than strictly contractual ones. In fact, a distinction was
made in some legislation between commercial leases and “social” leases, the latter usually
involving family- or subfamily-sized tenancies while commercial leases are usually for highly
capitalized enterprises. Tenancy legislation was often included in agrarian reforms, eliminating
the more onerous practices for tenants and some types of share tenancy.
In general, legislative reform was intended to protect tenants, provide them continuity and
stability in farming, increase tenure security for tenants, and prohibit some practices (e.g.,
obligations to work for landowner, arbitrary evictions, moving tenants from parcel to parcel).
Provisions included tenancy conditions, termination and renewal of leases, rents (cash and in-
kind), and options to purchase land. Legislation sometimes also recognized de facto tenancy
where there were no written contracts, particularly in areas of high illiteracy.
Our reading of the literature has shown that tenancy legislation and land reforms of the
1970s and 1980s in Latin America have continued this trend of improving tenancy conditions by
increasing tenure security and stability for tenants, controlling rents, prohibiting eviction,
facilitating the ownership of land on the part of tenants, and improving terms such as interest
rates charged by landowners and crop prices paid to sharecroppers. Some agrarian reforms (e.g.,
the Peruvian 1969 agrarian reform) simply outlawed indirect tenancy completely in an attempt to
create a significant sector of family owner-occupied farms.
These well-intentioned objectives were not always achieved and, in some cases, actually
decreased tenant security and stability. Landowners were often able to preempt legislation by
evicting tenants, particularly sharecroppers and labor tenants, from the land to avoid complying
with new work conditions or losing their land. Examples of these can be found in Peru with Ley
10885 of 1947 (Matos Mar 1976) and in Colombia with Ley Primera of 1968 (Salazar 1982;
Machado 1984). Tenancy legislation in Ecuador (for example, Decreto 373 and Decreto 1001 in
1970) was intended to improve tenancy conditions and allow tenants to buy the land in the
coastal rice-producing areas. The ultimate objective was to improve rice yields which were low
because landowners were not investing in increasing yields or in improving the land. The
enactment of the legislation, however, resulted in landowners evicting tenants from their land
(Redclift 1978).
An example of mixed results from protective tenancy legislation can be found in Argentina.
Tenancy laws and regulations in Argentina, particularly since mid-1940s until late 1950s, gave
renters and sharecroppers stability on the land (written contracts were enforced, contracts were
extended indefinitely for years), prohibited servile conditions (such as work obligations on
landowner’s land and forced sale of harvest to owner), and enforced better rent conditions (rents
were frozen or reduced, initially because of great reductions in crop prices). This legislation
resulted in increased income for these tenants. Tenants who were generally contracted verbally
for one year or one crop (e.g., contratistas por una sola cosecha, tamberos medieros) were not
included in legislation. Landowners’ reaction was to increase these types of tenancies as other
tenant contracts were cancelled or bought out. Landowners also reverted to either administering
their properties directly with salaried workers (e.g., the extensive livestock ranches) or using
contratistas. Tenancy between 1947 and 1960 fell to 25 percent fewer tenants and 30 percent
fewer hectares. With regard to production levels between owners and tenants, they were the same35
or higher for tenants, partly due to the fact that tenants, since they had tenure security and higher
incomes, invested in the land (Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development 1964).
Since the late 1980s, there has been a policy shift away from social concerns and tenants’
protection to policies dictated by production goals, efficiency, and market-driven economy
concerns.
5.0 TENANCY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Most agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa is held under customary tenure that provides access
to land to all recognized members of the community. While land distribution may not be
equitable among households, land concentration found in other regions such as Latin America is
not common. Limited access to land, therefore, generally occurs at the community level rather
than within the community. If a household does not have access to sufficient land and communal
land is not available for allocation, it generally looks for more land outside of its community.
Consequently, tenant farmers in Africa have typically been migrants.
19 In addition, customary
tenure systems generally do not permit land sales, particularly to persons outside the community;
therefore, tenancy is one of the few means to access land. Since customary tenure emphasizes the
use of land for food production rather than land as an asset, tenancy arrangements are generally
not based on market values.
Another common feature in African tenancy arrangements involving migrants is the
provision not only of production inputs by landholder to tenant, but also of many consumption
goods such as food and housing. This is particularly the case in short-term (i.e., year-to-year)
tenant arrangements, when tenants are newly arrived to an area, or where tenants are not allowed
to grow food crops.
Tenancy does occur not only because land shortages exist in some areas, but also because
some farmers have access to more production resources than they can use on their land.
Typically tenancy arrangements under this set of circumstances are between households in the
same or neighboring communities.
Tenancy in Africa is often just one production relation that coexists with direct production
by landholders and wage labor production; several tenancy arrangements are often also used
together, such as sharecropping and fixed cash rentals.
20 Nor is it restricted to private property
landholdings; it is used under different property relations (communal, private, and state-leased
land).
While most of the literature suggests that the availability of land for sharecropping, cash
renting, and other tenancy arrangements is adequate even under customary tenure (see, for
example, Kevane 1997), some authors conclude that certain aspects of customary tenure pose
constraints on land leasing. In a paper on land rental markets in sub-Saharan Africa (Lyne, Roth,
and Troutt 1997), the authors found that in spite of unutilized land and high income levels per
                                               
19 In Latin America, tenants are more commonly residents of the community where they farm. The inequality or
concentration of landownership is among families within a community rather than between communities, creating a
dualistic tenure structure of large estates surrounded by land-poor or landless peasant households.
20 Labor tenancy appears to be unusual in contemporary Africa except in South Africa where land concentration is
high.36
hectare, the market for rental contracts were constrained: many more farmers wanted to rent in
land than actually did. It would appear that tenure insecurity for both parties raises transactions
costs and rental rates to unattractive levels.
5.1 TENANCY TRENDS
Tenancy arrangements with migrants in the past were typically negotiated with the authorities in
charge of administering communal land because land was owned by a community, clan, or
extended family. Some if not most tenants would join together to negotiate tenancy conditions
with communal land authorities. More recently, with increasing privatization of land, there is a
trend toward tenancy arrangements negotiated directly between tenant and landholder, although
most tenancy contracts are still on land held under customary tenure (Gyasi 1994).
Intracommunity tenancy arrangements are also becoming more common as accessible
arable land becomes scarce and agricultural production increasingly involves the use of
commercial inputs and machinery. Since farmers generally do not have access to credit, those
households in the community that are able to acquire commercial inputs seek to rent in or
sharecrop land from their neighbors.
5.1.1 Sharecropping in sub-Saharan Africa
Sharecropping in Africa has been used by tenants as a means of gaining rights to land, by
landholders to secure rights to land, and by both tenants and landholders to access more land.
As land becomes scarce and “individual” rights to land become stronger and the norm, the use of
sharecropping by tenants to gain secure rights to land becomes more difficult; however;
development of land and cash-crop markets increases the use of sharecropping for production, at
least in the medium run (the long-term trend appears to be toward fixed cash rentals and use of
wage labor).
Robertson (1982) argues that sharecropping is not disappearing under increased capitalist
agricultural production; rather the sharecropper is one stage between wage laborer and cash
renter: the sharecropper becomes a cash renter, paying a fixed rent, in turn hiring in wage labor.
This process is possible in those areas where sharecroppers and renters acquire some permanent
land-use rights that can be sold or passed on to heirs (Berry 1987).
The following sections will describe three general sharecropping patterns: between
smallholder households that hold land under customary tenure, between owners of large estates
and land-poor or landless households, and on agricultural project areas promoted by the state.
5.1.1.1 Sharecropping as a combining of resources
Our reading of the African literature indicates that most sharecropping occurs between
smallholder farmers, although there are cases involving agricultural enterprises or agricultural
commodity traders that enter into sharecropping contracts with smallholders for production of
cash crops. In most cases, access to land is not the principal constraint that leads to sharecropping
arrangements; rather it is the short supply of labor and/or movable capital such as machinery or
draught animals, particularly for certain key agricultural periods such as plowing or harvest.
Most rural families that enter into sharecropping agreements usually do have access to sufficient
land for their subsistence, but also want to produce cash crops such as cotton, cocoa, or37
groundnuts. Sharecropping patterns over time often follow the family cycle of both parties;
families sharecrop as they increase or decrease in size, as their access to land changes, and as
family labor migrates out and then returns.
In these rural areas, the wage labor supply is very low or practically nonexistent and often
unreliable. Farmers enter into sharecropping arrangements, often with migrant newcomers
(called “strangers” in a number of countries) who work for a specified period of time producing
cash crops. These sharecroppers are seldom landless workers; they usually have land in their
home community. These sharecropping arrangements are considered as mutually beneficial for
both parties,
21 a mechanism for combining the different resources available to households in
order to produce cash crops without either party needing to take on all the risk or obtaining cash
for wage labor or cash rents.
While cash crop production is usually the motivating reason for smallholders to enter into
sharecropping, the production of food for subsistence is also of prime importance. Robertson
(1987) argues that the high risk (largely because of agroclimatic factors that are not compensated
by inputs or capital investment), the price fluctuation, and the subsistence character of
noncapitalized agricultural production in Africa, as well as the fragility of rural household
reproduction, are significant and important reasons for entering into sharecropping: the sharing
of risks and the collaboration in producing both food and cash income for both parties makes
sharecropping arrangements attractive. The unlikelihood that these conditions will change
significantly in the near future may mean that sharecropping will remain a vibrant way of
producing cash crops.
The role of gender becomes apparent in this need/tension to produce both food and cash
crops and to provide both sharecropper and landholder families with food. This is related to
undeveloped markets for consumer goods, including food, and particularly food that has been
processed and cooked. Consumable food implies considerable labor to process food crops,
collect fuel and water for cooking, obtain cooking condiments, and actually cook the meal.
Women both produce food and process it for human consumption and men produce cash crops.
Without women and their labor, however, men could not be sharecroppers (women are seldom
sharecroppers) nor could they produce cash crops.
In the northern highland area of Ethiopia, Bruce (1974) describes sharecropping
arrangements on a communal land tenure system prior to the 1975 agrarian reform.
22 Land
distribution was more egalitarian (though hardly equal) because the customary tenure system had
not been destroyed during colonialism and landholdings were much smaller than in southern
Ethiopia where large estates were formed. Most families owned land and were actively engaged
in farming; however, all arable land was being cultivated and there was no unclaimed
agricultural land for allocation. Sharecropping would typically occur between two landholding
families, one of which had more land than it could cultivate and the other more labor than it
could use on its own land. In this type of sharecropping, called tetebani, the tenant assumed full
managerial responsibility for farming the leased land. Sometimes the family that put up the land
                                               
21 In some cases, it is the tenant supplying inputs, movable capital, and/or labor who has as much control, if not more,
over the sharecropping conditions than the landholder, and who benefits most from the arrangement.
22 Since colonial rule until the mid-1970s, Ethiopia had two general land tenure situations (roughly north and south)
that included tenancy arrangements such as sharecropping, albeit under different conditions. In the south, absentee
landowners had large estates which were divided into small parcels worked by sharecroppers (Ellis 1980).38
could not work it because they did not have plow oxen—thus, they were compelled to let it out
to a family with oxen. The tenant paid between one-fourth and one-half of the harvest as rent.
These agreements were not seen as permanent or long term (though in some cases they did
become long-standing contracts), but rather temporary arrangements to “redistribute” land and
labor.
The other type of sharecropping, haresti riba’e, involved a landowning family and a
landless family or person. The tenant supplied only labor and the landowner put up land, seeds,
and plow oxen. In this arrangement, the landowner took three-fourths of the harvest and could
oblige the sharecropper to provide labor on other parcels of land. This type of landowner usually
had more land and capital (plow oxen) than the family labor could work and preferred using
sharecropping because of lack of cash for wage payments.
Tree sharecropping
Sharecropping in tree-crop production is practiced in much of Africa. Cocoa trees in Ghana and
palm trees in Nigeria are tended by sharecroppers who then harvest the trees and share the output
with the owner of the tree plantation. A review of several studies done in Ghana offers an
excellent example of different tree sharecropping arrangements.
Tree sharecropping in Ghana is very old and previously was used for production of palm oil
and kernels; it is still the most common type of tenancy arrangement. According to Ollennu
(1985), abusa as a sharecropping arrangement evolved out of a labor tenancy arrangement where
the tenant worked two days out of a six-day week on the owner’s land in return for usufruct
rights to a piece of land.
Boadu (1992) describes two types of sharecropping arrangements used on cocoa plantations;
the tenancy conditions are based on risk and transactions cost factors rather than on age of trees
which determines potential yield. In the abusa system, the sharecropper receives one-third of the
crop because of high risk factors (pests and disease can destroy up to 30% of a crop) and low
transactions costs for the landholder (tenancy conditions are standard and well understood, and
typically there is a stable, trusting, and long-term relationship between sharecropper and
landowner). In addition, inputs other than labor are minimal. These land-use rights acquired by
abusa sharecroppers can be sold or passed on to heirs (Berry 1987).
In the other sharecropping system, nkotokuano, the sharecropper is paid a fixed amount for
each load of cocoa produced—this amount is always less than one-third the value of the harvest.
In this case, production risks are much lower than in areas where abusa is practiced, but
transactions costs are high: work conditions are not standard thus negotiable, the fee paid to
sharecroppers is negotiated since it is a cash payment not a fixed share of crop, and the
relationship between both parties is not stable or trusting leading to frequent renegotiations of
conditions and fees and the need to monitor labor efforts of the sharecropper. In addition, the
landowner sometimes has to pay the sharecropper for some tasks because of the latter’s tendency
to allocate work time to other employment opportunities.
Boadu (1992) also describes a hybrid arrangement of sharecropping and wage labor. On
plantations with young cocoa trees (low yields), wage workers are used to tend and care for the
trees. It is common, however, to pay the laborer, in addition to the wage, one-third of the harvest
so that laborers are motivated to exercise greater care and invest more effort during the first few39
years of plantation formation. These wage laborers are then likely to become abusa
sharecroppers on the plantation once the trees have matured and yields have reached high levels.
Another type of contemporary sharecropping in Ghana uses various sharing formulas
depending on amount of input provided by tenant and landowner and on age of trees (i.e., yield
potential) from equal sharing of production between tenant and landowner to three-fourths for
tenant and one-fourth for landowner. Payments by the sharecropper are made to communal land
authorities or to the customary landholder. There is also an arrangement that combines leasing
and sharecropping on palm-oil tree plantations where the tenant pays a fee for use of the land for
a set period of time, but farms it on a sharecropping basis (Gyasi 1994).
5.1.1.2 Landlord and sharecropper
Sharecropping between estate owners and smallholders in Malawi has been practiced in the
production of export crops such as tea, tobacco, cotton, and coffee. Tenancy production for these
crops began under colonial rule and initially involved compulsory labor tenancy (thangata)
imposed on African smallholders or evolved out of contract labor agreements with smallholders.
In addition to their usual tenancy obligations, sharecroppers were often obliged to work for the
estate as wage laborers during peak labor periods. These large estates, held by mainly British
landholders who had alienated large tracts of communal and uninhabited land, remained estates
after independence and are currently held by mainly Malawians. Land concentration, therefore,
is still a characteristic of the land tenure structure in Malawi.
Sharecropping arrangements and conditions have remained basically unchanged since the
colonial period with the exception that crop prices are set by government and most contracts are
oral (during colonial times, most contracts were written). Several studies on tenant farming in
Malawi (Nankumba 1991; McCraken 1985) reveal that the typical sharecropper is generally a
married man with some land who produces tobacco, for example, on an estate parcel with his
family for part of the year (about six months) and food crops on the family parcel for the rest of
the year. This type of sharecropping in Malawi is called visiting tenant system because of the
temporary nature of the tenancy (normally only six months of the year) and the migrant status of
the sharecropper and his family (Vaughan and Chipande 1986)
This arrangement appears to have advantages for both parties: the sharecropper obtains
access to land, cash credit, and production inputs and services (such as tractor) on credit from the
estate; and the estate owner obtains a tobacco crop without paying cash wages and with minimal
risk—if crops fail, the sharecropper is burdened with debt to the estate. In addition, since estates
accept only married men for sharecropping, they gain the labor of the whole family. On some
estates, food rations are given or a small piece of land is made available to the sharecropper and
family for subsistence food production.
The sharecropper’s responsibilities are to provide manual labor, repay all advances (both
cash and in-kind), and sell all production to the estate. Disadvantages are borne mainly by the
sharecropper who typically has only an oral contract, often with conditions not clearly and
completely determined and with no assurance that the contract will be renewed; the sharecropper
also carries most of the risk if weather or prices are not favorable since all costs are accrued to
him. Sharecroppers have usually worked previously as wage laborers on an estate for some years
or have had farming experience on their own farms before being accepted as a tenant.40
There is evidence that estate owners and managers attempt to underpay sharecroppers for
the harvest and overcharge them for advances and services. Nevertheless, sharecropping tenants
are able to increase their household income by growing tobacco. Income data (Jaffee,
Mkandawire, and Bertoli 1991) show that the majority of sharecroppers do obtain moderately
higher incomes than either smallholders who only farm their own land or estate wage workers.
Sharecroppers use this income to supplement income from the family holding and to invest in
small livestock; a small proportion of sharecroppers are able to earn enough to accumulate some
capital which is invested in other activities such as off-farm businesses or even setting up their
own modest estate. There is, however, a substantial minority of sharecroppers that obtain no cash
income from sharecropping, being barely able to pay their production and consumption debts to
the estate. It would appear that a tenant has to have some resources, other than labor, to be a
sharecropper—such as food for subsistence produced by the family while working as a
sharecropper. Tenants are seldom landless or very poor peasants.
5.1.1.3 Sharecropping on state-sponsored agricultural projects
Large projects to increase agricultural production have been implemented under both colonial
and independent states. Work relations on these projects have often been problematic since
households and individuals do not always respond to policies, incentives, and coercion as
administrators and policymakers expect. An example of official work and tenure relations
evolving into informal sharecropping is exemplified by the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan.
On the Gezira Scheme (a major irrigation project started in 1920s), the colonial government
took over large areas of land along the north-central Nile Valley in the Sudan for the commercial
production of cotton. After putting in irrigation infrastructure, the colonial agency administrating
the scheme initially gave out tenancies to farmers on a sharecropping basis. As recounted in
Barnett and Abdelkarim (1991) and Abdelkarim (1985), sharecropping was replaced with a type
of cash rental in the early 1980s: tenants pay fixed fees for land and water and sell their cotton
production to the state trading board. All other crops besides cotton (groundnuts, wheat, and
vegetables) are marketed by the tenant.
Initially, tenants hired wage labor to supplement household labor on the farm. When these
tenant households found it difficult to finance their farming operation because of reduced
availability of household labor and little access to cash or inexpensive credit (the payment of
wages became particularly difficult), they began to give parts of their rented land to workers on a
sharecropping basis. Many tenants now find themselves resorting to sharecroppers to keep their
state-leased parcels in production as dictated by Gezira Scheme regulations. Usually these
sharecroppers are migrants who have settled in the area and have accumulated some cash
through wage employment. They utilize their own household labor (including female labor
which typically is not in the wage labor market in Sudan) supplemented by wage labor during
peak labor periods (particularly weeding and harvesting). During periods of low labor demand,
many of these sharecroppers also work off the farm to supplement farm income.
Sharecropping in this case is an example of wage labor being replaced by tenancy. The
Gezira Scheme illustrates how labor and tenure relations evolve over time, and not necessarily in
unilinear fashion, as conditions (in this case, production system, state policy, migration) change.
It also shows how complex and convoluted land-labor relations can become as market
development, customary tenure, and state intervention combine and create unexpected structures
and practices.41
5.1.2 Fixed-cash and in-kind rental
Cash rental of land in Africa is generally practiced under two tenure conditions: (1) between
estate landowners and smallholders, and (2) between smallholder households, typically within a
customary tenure system. Where land is not an asset and agriculture is a means of subsistence
and reproduction rather than a source of cash income or capital accumulation, rents are
“symbolic” in the sense that the renter pays a fee as a symbol that he/she does not own the land,
not as a reflection of the commercial value of the land and its production potential.
5.1.2.1 Fixed rentals within customary tenure
In Iboland (Nigeria), for example, renting of customary land was used in the past for growing
subsistence crops, not cash crops, and was not considered a commercial or economic
arrangement or activity. The renter was given permission by the proper community authority
who “showed” him/her the land. Agreements were oral and rent (or tribute) was paid in kind to
show proof of ownership and was given within a religious-cultural ceremony. The land rented
out was communal land, belonging to a village, family, or clan, and proceeds from this
tribute/rent were usually utilized for the community. Relations between renter and community
landowner were highly personal, with gifts given at different times of the year. Permanent
structures and perennial crops, particularly trees, were prohibited in Nigeria; only renters with
long-term lease agreements were allowed to plant trees.
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As agricultural production and land acquired commercial value in Nigeria, rents have
become cash payments and have approached a market/commercial value (rather than being
symbolic), and written agreements have become more common. Rents are also calculated
differently: in traditional rentals, rents were a fixed, symbolic payment and the renter could use
as much as land as he/she and his/her family could farm; in other words, rent was not based on
the amount of land rented. As production and rental agreements became more commercial, the
amount of land or the amount of harvest became a consideration in fixing the rent (Grossman
1968).
When fixed renting is on land that has tree crops (i.e., permanent crops), it is quite clear that
what is being rented out by the landowner is the care and harvest of the trees (e.g., palm oil,
rubber, kola, cocoa), not the land itself. Fixed renting is directly or indirectly related to cash-crop
production: tenants either engage directly in cash-crop production or grow food crops for those
areas where so much land is in cash or industrial crops that there is a shortage of food for the
local population. These renters produce highly marketable food crops for urban markets such as
rice, yams, and cassava (Udo 1975).
As we saw in sharecropping, the transformation of temporal and/or unstable labor and land
relations into a more stable and permanent status is not uncommon; some migrants become part
of the community, trusted by landholders, and either acquire quasi-permanent tenancy rights or
move up from being labor tenants, wage laborers, or sharecroppers into fixed-cash renters.
24 One
                                               
23 Kola tenancy in Nigeria has been a permanent right to occupy the land by a stranger after a single payment of some
money and subject to continued good behavior on the part of the stranger. In Ghana, renters of land on palm-oil
farms would pay a fee and acquire the land for extended periods of time, from 25 to 50 years (Gyasi 1994).
24 Another example, in addition to the Nigerian one cited above, is saffer dingoo in The Gambia for groundnut
(peanut) production (Sallah 1987).42
pattern is for a migrant farmer to start as a wage laborer on someone’s land and eventually to
become a tenant farmer once he/she has some savings and gains the confidence of the farm
owner. Depending on his/her relations with the owner of the land (he/she may marry into the
family, for example) or the community, he/she may become a more-or-less permanent tenant,
with permanent use-rights to the land (the land is not his/hers, just the products of the land). In
some areas, tenants are allowed to use land permanently and have the right to pass on the land to
heirs provided a yearly rent is paid (Adegboye 1966).
As land in Nigeria becomes more privatized and individually owned, these tenants on what
was customary land become squatters on individual owners’ land and must come to a new
agreement with the owner or leave the land. Increasing concentration of landownership may
make rental conditions for tenants more stringent (Grossman 1968).
Western Sudan is a case where there are very active wage labor and rental land markets.
Land is owned by families either as communal land or in private ownership. Most households
engage in both farming and off-farm wage labor and agricultural practices are mostly
homogeneous. There are few modern inputs, no animal traction, and little tractor use; the major
inputs are land and labor. In addition, harsh climate makes farming very risky for all.
Kevane (1997) maintains that the land tenure system permits cash-rental arrangements and
that the traditional labor and land markets are functioning well, considering local conditions such
as lack of credit and crop insurance. Communal land is administered by the village authority who
allocates usufruct rights to uncleared land to villagers or new residents, who in turn pay a 10
percent harvest share. The village authority, by collecting the annual share, retains ownership
rights to the land in the name of the village. Usufructuaries, however, have secure and permanent
rights to the land because they cleared the land. If the village authority stops collecting the annual
share, ownership rights to the land pass to the user and his/her descendants.
Rented land is usually cleared land and is rented out by either the village authority or the
landholder; rental transfers temporary land rights to the renter, not usufructuary rights, which are
held by the landholder and are considered permanent. In other words, rented land can be taken
back at any time. Kevane (1997) found that while there is some concern on the part of
landholders of being able to reclaim land that has been rented out for a long period of time, and
in spite of the existence of a very active and flexible wage labor market, they prefer renting out
unused land rather than working it themselves with wage labor because of the lack of cash for
paying wages. Renters tend to be wealthy, but land-poor households.
5.1.2.2 Fixed rentals between estate owner and smallholder
Rental tenancy in Uganda is a curious mixture of customary and private property rights with
aspects of both fixed-cash renting and sharecropping. Recent developments also offer an insight
into what appears to be the tendency toward land rentals in Africa as land becomes an asset
value, urban areas expand, and commercial agricultural production becomes dominant.
Many scholars have studied the historical changes in land tenure and tenancy in Uganda; the
following paragraphs are based on several representative studies (Mugerwa 1973; Fortt 1973;
West 1965, 1971; Mukwaya 1953). In the early 1900s, the land tenure system in the Buganda
area of colonial Uganda was formally transformed from a customary system based on a chief’s
domain over land and community members’ rights to agricultural land, to a system approaching
freehold tenure with one legislative decree, the Uganda Agreement of March 1990. The colonial43
government conferred to chiefs and other notable personages individual ownership rights to large
extensions of land called mailo estates. These estates were already settled by smallholders under
customary tenure; however, their usufructuary rights were not legally recognized. Mailo owners
permitted “their peasants” to retain possession of the land (called kibanja land) they were
occupying. Mailo tenure in effect converted them from customary usufructuary holders into
tenants on private property. Other persons who wanted to settle on mailo land had to approach
the mailo owner and get permission to occupy a specific piece of land. Initially, most tenants
paid little or no rent and labor services, particularly on large estates. Mailo owners were
considered lords of their area and their tenants were their servants.
With the commercialization of agriculture and growth of a market economy, the value of
land as an asset motivated some landowners to begin charging high cash rents to their tenants. In
the late 1920s, legislation was passed to protect these tenants from arbitrary eviction and
specified the type and amounts of rent to be paid. It also laid out the rights and conditions of both
tenant and landowner. Rent consisted of two types: busuulu and envujjo (in the literature, these
are often called taxes). Busuulu was rent on the land itself and was a set amount for each kibanja
held regardless of size; envujjo was paid on the production of cash crops (cotton, coffee, and
maize) and certain other economic activities (such as beer production for sale). Envujjo consisted
of a set cash payment per unit of production. With regard to tenants’ rights, legislation allowed
eviction for a minimum of causes (such as failure to pay rent for three years) and only by court
order, giving tenants permanent and secure usufructuary rights to the land they held. These rights
have been heritable; however, tenants could not transfer the tenancy nor sell the land to another
person without consent of the landowner. Thus, while tenants were legally operating on private
property, actual practice was based on customary norms, and “rents” did not actually reflect the
asset value of land.
Since the amounts of both these rental payments were established by law in the 1920s, over
time their value eroded, eventually becoming quite small in real terms. Some landowners did not
even bother to collect rents, particularly from poor farmers. Other landowners began to
circumvent these limitations by not accepting new busuulu tenants, by granting short-term
(several years) tenancies on a strictly sharecropping basis, by charging high initial premiums
from new tenants, and by charging extra fees for cash cropping.
The Land Reform Decree of 1975 declared that all land belonged to the state, abolishing all
other ownership rights, including mailo, and repealing previous legislation, including legislation
that protected kibanja tenants. A tenure structure to codify the rights that persons had to land
under the new ownership model has not been fully implemented, and mailo owners and tenants
have continued to operate in the semi-customary arrangements they were practicing previous to
1975. Some major changes are that there are no restrictions on rents, and landowners have much
greater flexibility to evict tenants. Some tenants have banded together and successfully resisted
the most abusive practices on the part of landowners (Opyene 1993). Rental arrangements in
other parts of Uganda, such as in Bunyoro and Lango, are similar to the arrangements on mailo
land in that tenants pay rents or have sharecropping arrangements with owners of relatively large
estates (Beattie 195-?; Opyene 1993).
5.1.3 Labor tenancy
From the literature, it appears that labor tenancy was common in the past, both under customary
tenure and with estate agriculture during colonialism. Under customary tenure, labor tenancy44
typically involved community residents who were considered of a different and inferior ethnic
status or clan. Two very different contemporary labor tenancy situations will be presented,
reflecting the diversity of land-labor relations in Africa.
In The Gambia, labor tenancy, called sama manilla, is used for groundnut (peanut)
production, Gambia’s biggest cash crop and export earner. Labor tenancy is preferred over
sharecropping, wage labor, and fixed rent under conditions of climate risks (risk of inadequate
rainfall) and labor shortages (Sallah 1987).
25 Wage labor requires large cash outlays by the
landowner who also assumes all the production risks; in addition, the wage laborer can easily
leave the farm at any time, leaving the landowner scrambling to obtain labor at peak labor
periods. Fixed rentals are not attractive to migrant farmers as they must assume all the risks of
production. And sharecropping requires the landowner to closely monitor production output,
prices, and share agreements. Migrant workers are in high demand and sharecropping might be
seen by landowners as giving them too much freedom—labor tenancy is perhaps a happy
medium for both migrant, who gains access to land and obtains consumption and input goods to
grow a cash crop with no long-term obligations, and host farmer, who obtains labor that is
committed for the entire growing season without large cash outlays and minimal monitoring.
In return for usufruct rights to a parcel of land, migrant laborers are obliged to work between
two to four days on the landholder’s own fields. The labor tenant cultivates both groundnuts and
food crops on his usufruct fields and disposes of all the production. Groundnut production in The
Gambia is done on rain-fed agricultural land (thus running the risk of inadequate water) and
requires much labor at peak periods, particularly harvest. Labor tenancy brings in labor from
other parts of the country and region at minimal cash outlay for landowners and ensures that the
labor will be available during peak periods. Reflecting undeveloped market conditions and the
migrants’ lack of easy access to goods, the landowner, in addition to land, provides labor tenants
with food, tools, housing, and some inputs such as seeds. Some of these goods (food, seeds, and
other nondurable goods) are loans to be repaid in kind or by some other good or service, such as
gathering firewood (Sallah 1987).
Tenancy in South Africa has had a torturous history. More than in other African countries,
South African governments over the last century have stripped black South Africans of their
lands and granted them to white owners. At the same time, they have restricted the mobility of
blacks by relocating them to areas called homelands
26 and denying them the right to travel or live
outside those areas without permission. While these policies have given white farmers access to
and ownership of vast areas of agricultural land, including some of the most fertile land in South
Africa, they have also, ironically, complicated their access to labor.
Initially, white farmers were able to obtain farm labor through cash rent and sharecropping
arrangements; typically tenant families (called squatters) had lived on the land before the arrival
of the white farmers, and these tenancy arrangements gave these disenfranchised families access
to land and some control over production and use of the land. These practices were outlawed in
the 1913 Land Act
27 in an attempt to give white farmers more control over their land. Cash
                                               
25 Labor tenancy, paradoxically, appears to be used in cases where migrant tenants are in high demand and able to
control labor conditions.
26 Later called national states or self-governing territories.
27 Earlier attempts (in the late 1800s) to impose restrictions were not effective because the vast number of squatters
(tenants) made it very difficult to enforce the provisions restricting, and later abolishing, labor tenancy.45
rentals and sharecropping were replaced with labor tenancy: in return for use rights to a piece of
land and the right to graze a specific number of cattle, the tenant and his family worked on the
landowner’s agricultural fields. No wages or rents were paid.
Beginning in the 1960s, attempts to prohibit labor tenancy and replace it with wage labor
resulted in illegal tenancy practices, new hybrid tenancy arrangements, and the mass eviction of
tenants. Finally in 1980, labor tenancy was formally abolished in all South Africa. An
arrangement that has evolved is one in which producers are paid a very low wage (rural wages
did not increase during the 1970s and 1980s) and given access to much smaller parcels of land
than before. Although income for these families has been very low, access to land, even a small
parcel, is important for them as a home base for the extended family and as security in times of
wage labor contraction. Until recently,
28 another important factor is that access to land also
secured permission to live and work outside the homeland areas for family members (van
Onselen 1993; A Toehold on the Land,1988; Clacey 1989; “Cheaper than slaves” 1993).
5.1.4 Reverse tenancy
Reverse tenancy can be found in Africa but, in contrast to Latin America, the cases we
encountered are mostly tenancy arrangements between community households rather than
smallholders with agribusiness firms, large commercial farms, or wholesalers. Typically, the
landholder lacks resources (other than land) to farm while the tenant (who may also own some
land) has capital and inputs, particularly traction, and is looking for more land to farm. Two
examples of reverse sharecropping, one in Lesotho and the other in Ethiopia, and one of reverse
cash renting in South Africa are offered below.
The context in Lesotho is that land is held under customary tenure—freehold ownership in
Lesotho is not legally recognized—and sale of land is prohibited. In addition, there is little
agricultural land left to allocate to households creating a situation of land shortage. But many
households lack the resources to cultivate the land they have, leaving it underutilized.
Sharecropping typically involves a landholder who cannot cultivate because of lack of labor,
inputs, capital, or traction and a landless or land-poor farmer who has these resources. The
sharecropper may have been a migrant worker in South Africa, for example, and has been able to
acquire inputs from wage savings. The landholder may be an elderly widow who does not have
sufficient labor and inputs or households with no oxen for plowing. Both parties usually provide
equal shares of labor and divide the harvest equally (Lawry 1993).
In Ethiopia, before proposed tenancy reform legislation could be passed to regulate land
tenancy, a redistributive land reform law was passed in 1975 which prohibited land leasing. Land
is property of the state and “owners” hold long-term leases. Land reform distributed land to
farmers supposedly obviating the need for tenancy arrangements, and certainly land distribution
among farmers is more egalitarian. Sharecropping, however, continues to be practiced because
some farm households experience imbalances in production factors: land, labor particularly for
plowing, oxen, or seeds. In Ethiopia, these arrangements are not between large landholder and
resource-poor tenant, but often are between a poor landowners and relatively wealthy tenants
                                               
28 Influx control was abolished in 1986 and inhabitants of the national states and self-governing territories could live
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who have the capital and/or labor to cultivate more land than they have. Since imbalances among
production factors are often temporary, sharecropping contracts tend to be temporary (Ege 1994).
Reverse cash rentals of customary land by outsider commercial farmers occur in the
sugarcane-producing area of KwaZulu, South Africa. These rentals, called CSAs (Contract
Service Agreements), are quite common. In this area, local chiefs recognize the CSAs, thus
approving these rentals. This approval gives both parties, community members and commercial
farmers, the perception that their land rights are recognized and secure. Commercial farmers with
access to production resources rent in land from customary landholder households whose
members are often engaged in nonagricultural work. The renter assumes all production costs and
pays the landowner between 10 to 15 percent of gross income as rent (Lyne, Thomson, and
Ortmann 1996; Thomson and Lyne 1993).
5.2 RATIONALE FOR TENANCY ARRANGEMENTS
Several factors most determine the decision by both parties, landholder and tenant, to enter into
tenancy: labor, access to resources and inputs, and risk. While these are important factors in other
regions, in Africa they are particularly acute problems. Constrained access to land generally is
not, at least until now, a major motivation for tenancy arrangements. Another factor that has
affected tenancy arrangements are state policies, legislation, and regulations.
5.2.1 Access to labor
Landholders prefer tenants to wage labor as they are relatively more stable labor arrangements,
an important consideration in scarce wage-labor conditions common in many parts of rural
Africa. Tenancy offers landholders a means to both attract workers and encourage stable working
relations and it motivates high work efforts. In addition, tenants provide a labor pool for the
landholder’s own production at peak labor periods. Tenancy is also preferred by workers since it
gives them higher status and better working conditions than wage labor. Many sharecropping
arrangements, such as abusa in Ghana (see subsection 5.1.1.1), give producers the opportunity
for long-term, stable, and independent farming. One of the most attractive advantages to being an
abusa tenant is the right to grow food crops, increasing the sharecropper’s ability to settle on the
farm with his family. Robertson (1982) argues that sharecropping, particularly of the abusa type,
is not disappearing under increased capitalist agricultural production, rather the sharecropper is
one stage between wage laborer and cash renter with permanent and secure access rights to land.
In some areas, land-use rights acquired by sharecroppers (and later renters) can be sold or passed
on to heirs (Berry 1987).
5.2.2 Access to resources
Constrained access to resources and inputs, particularly in the absence of cash and/or credit,
features strongly in the decision by both landholder and worker to enter into tenancy. What is
evident from the different tenancy arrangements throughout the region is the prime role the
pooling of resources between landholder and tenant plays in tenancy. While landholder and
tenant are not always on equal footing, tenancy is an option for both of them to combine the
resources they have for increasing production, particularly of cash crops. Although tenants may
also have land, it is the lack of other resources that drives the need for tenancy: both tenant and47
landholder combine their labor, inputs, work animals (particularly for plowing), and machinery
to produce crops. Sharecrop tenancy also obviates the need for large cash outlays by both parties.
What is interesting in Africa, as we saw in cases of reverse tenancy (subsection 5.1.4), is that it is
not necessarily the tenant who is lacking in resources but often the landholding party.
5.2.3 Risk factor
Agriculture is a risky business: the investment cycle is long, weather is often uncooperative, and
supply is generally unpredictable making product prices volatile. In the African context, these
risks are compounded by difficulty in obtaining inputs, low technological levels, lack of crop
insurance, lack of infrastructure, and scarce market outlets. Poor weather or pest infestations, for
example, cannot be alleviated because of lack of inputs (such as pesticides), low technology
levels, and infrastructure (such as irrigation). Commercial cropping, which typically requires
some cash outlay, becomes a particularly risky endeavor for producers close to subsistence
levels. Tenancy, especially sharecropping, offers both landholder and tenant a means to share
these risks and minimize their negative impacts.
5.2.4 Impact of past policies
State policies in the Africa region have affected tenancy in diverse ways. On the one hand,
policies to regulate or eliminate tenancy have sometimes affected tenants negatively or have led
to complicated arrangements or outright circumvention of legislation. Some policies have simply
ignored the role of tenancy in customary tenure systems. A caveat to any discussion about state
policy and its effect on tenancy arrangements is the weakness of state and governmental
institutions; attempts to regulate or outlaw tenancy practices have often met with little success
and with either outright evasion or distorted tenure systems.
5.2.4.1 Tenancy regulation
As we saw in the discussion on trends, tenancy is an old practice, often resorted to in
communities with customary tenure for the production of cash crops. Tenancy is often used
because both landholder and tenant lack resources, and it offers them an opportunity to pool their
resources. In addition, we saw that customary tenure has often adapted to the demands of
commercial agricultural production and commercial leasing of land. Attempts to regulate these
tenancy relations may lead to reduced production levels and tenure insecurity. For example,
Kevane (1997) maintains that in The Sudan indigenous labor and land markets are able to adapt
and function well considering local conditions such as lack of credit and crop insurance, and that
government intervention is not likely to increase tenure security for tenants, in part because of
weak government institutions.
While tenancy can be exploitative, particularly in areas where large estates have been
established, some governments have considered all tenancy as oppressive and have outlawed it
completely. In Ethiopia, for example, the Derg government implemented a land reform in 1975
that outlawed tenancy. While this aspect of the legislation was directed mainly at absentee
landowner-tenant relations in the south, it was also applied in the north where customary tenancy
between community households was practiced. As a result, labor and land arrangements evolved
in the north that evaded outright tenancy but which obtained some of the same results. In 1990,
the legislation against tenancy was repealed, allowing farmers to openly resume previous48
tenancy practices. Since one effect of the land reform redistribution in many northern areas was
the allocation of very small parcels of land, a number of households have resorted to renting
them out to other farmers and finding supplemental income from off-farm sources.
Robertson (1987), in his study of sharecropping in Ghana, The Sudan, Lesotho, and
Senegambia, maintains that state reform of sharecropping conditions and arrangements often
leads to significantly reducing sharecropping in general, usually to the detriment of the tenant
(who loses access to land) and to levels of agricultural production. Robertson points out that this
is particularly true if conditions in the agricultural sector or macroeconomic level offer
constraints, such as imperfect markets (for credit, inputs, and products) and lack of crop failure
insurance.
5.2.4.2 Nonrecognition of customary tenure relations
The other type of state action is to not recognize customary tenure structures, including tenancy.
As we saw in Nigeria, the privatization and titling of land turned customary tenants into
squatters. Their rights as tenants were negated and they had to arrive at new agreements with the
landowner or leave the land. Grossman (1968) also felt that land privatization and concentration
would make rental conditions for tenants more stringent.
In Uganda, when land was given as private property to local chiefs and other authorities in
1900, the customary rights of households living and farming on the land were not recognized.
The law turned usufructuary customary rights into cash-rent tenancy. Households, however,
continued to feel that they held customary rights to land; although they paid rent to the
landowner, they considered themselves permanent holders of their land. Subsequent legislation
in effect acknowledged these rights by making it very difficult to evict tenants. The result is a
confusion of who holds what rights. Formally, landowners have legal private ownership rights to
the land, but their “tenants” feel they have permanent usufructuary rights to the land they hold
even though they pay rent. When land is sold, for example, it is understood that its tenants
remain on the land.
5.2.4.3 Legislating customary tenure
Some legislative efforts to protect customary tenure by putting constraints on leasing have led to
unforeseen results. In Lesotho, for example, the 1979 Land Act enacted administrative
constraints on leasing customary land and transferring land rights. These difficulties have
resulted in reverse sharecropping and in some cases illegal leasing and sales of land. Commercial
farmers who want to invest in land improvements such as fertilizers, insecticides, and even
irrigation seek more control over farming management and security to long-term access to land.
For them, sharecropping is too risky and they prefer long-term lease arrangements. Since both
parties find the legal requirements for leasing land too complicated and time-consuming, they
enter into written agreements that are approved and witnessed by the local chief (Lawry 1993).
Both parties feel that these arrangements are sufficiently secure and commercial farmers have not
felt the need to purchase land as these leasing agreements give them the flexibility they need.
5.2.4.4 Customary tenure and commercial leasing
While some of the literature suggests that the availability of land for sharecropping, cash renting,
and other tenancy arrangements is adequate, even under customary tenure, some authors
conclude that certain aspects of customary tenure pose constraints on land leasing. In a paper on49
the land rental market in sub-Saharan Africa (Lyne, Roth, and Troutt 1997), the authors found
that in spite of unutilized land (idle land), the market for land tenancy contracts appeared
constrained: many more farmers wanted to rent in land than actually did. Although income per
hectare (net income data were not available) was higher for tenants than for owner-cultivators
(increasingly so in areas where renting is less frequent), it would appear that tenure insecurity for
both parties raises transactions costs and rental rates to unattractive levels.
Recent studies (Lyne, Thomson, and Ortmann 1996; Thomson and Lyne 1993) on fixed-
cash rentals in communal areas of South Africa also suggest constraints on renting customary
land. In KwaZulu, for example, most rural households have secure customary rights to land, but
many households engage in off-farm work leaving their land underutilized. Other households
which would want to rent in unused land find rental agreements risky and transactions costs high.
Authors of these two studies conclude that customary tenure produces tenure insecurity for the
renter because (1) property rights are not held by one person but by a number of persons (present
occupier of land, other family members, chief) who are not all readily known, and (2) conflict of
South African laws with regard to customary land. This situation leads to high transactions costs
when the renter attempts to obtain secure access rights to the rented land. The conflict of laws
means that risks are felt by both the landholder and the renter: the landholder fears that the tenant
may claim ownership rights to the land because she/he is working it, and the tenant fears that the
landholder can lay claim to the crops. Another risk for landholders comes from the power of
chiefs who insist on allegiance from their subjects; households renting out land which incurs the
chief’s displeasure may find themselves stripped of their rights to that land.
These same authors also found successful cases of reverse cash rentals on customary land by
outsider commercial farmers in the sugarcane-producing area of KwaZulu, South Africa. Local
chiefs approve of these rentals and both landholders and commercial farmers feel that their
respective land rights are secure (Lyne, Thomson, and Ortmann 1996; Thomson and Lyne 1993).
This case seems to demonstrate that commercial rentals of customary land are feasible and a
means of redistributing land access if customary authorities openly approve and recognize them.
5.2.4.5 Informal tenancy on state land
Tenancy regulations on state-owned land are often not flexible enough to adapt to changing
conditions, resulting in complex and possibly inefficient land-labor relations. On the Gezira
Scheme irrigation project in The Sudan, state tenants initially hired wage labor to supplement
household labor on the farm. When these tenant households found it difficult to finance their
farming operation due to reduced availability of household labor (because of out-migration) and
little access to cash for the payment of wages, they began to give parts of their rented land to
workers on a sharecropping basis. Many state tenants now find themselves resorting to
sharecroppers to keep their tenant parcels in production as dictated by Gezira Scheme
regulations. Usually these sharecroppers are migrants who have settled in the area and have
accumulated some cash through wage employment. They utilize their own household labor
(including female labor which typically is not in the wage labor market in The Sudan)
supplemented by wage labor during peak labor periods. During periods of low labor demand,
many of these sharecroppers also work off the farm to supplement farm income. This case shows
how complex and convoluted land-labor relations can become as market development,
customary tenure, and state intervention combine and create unexpected structures and practices.50
6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In reading the literature, we sought to identify the issues that influence the decisions of both
landlords and tenants in forming contracts. At a most basic level, there are only a few principal
issues. The vast and complicated literature yields this core of basic points and provides a rich
discussion of very many innuendoes and tangents that apply to the wide variety of experience
with land lease contracts.
In reaching an agreement, landlord and tenant consider those factors that impact on income.
The landlord attempts to maximize income from entering into a contract with one or more
persons who will farm the land. From his/her perspective, finding the means to resolve the
agency problem—shirking in work effort, incentive to invest in good stewardship of the land—is
a key issue. From the perspective of the tenant, who attempts to maximize income from entering
into a contract to make use of someone else’s land, the principal issues appear to be the
minimization of income variability—risk management—and the achievement of the ability to
access other, nonland factor markets.
The structure of land distribution and labor supply conditions this decision-making process
for both landlord and tenant and the outcome of the bargaining will depend on the relative power
of each party. For example, in cases where landlords face a tight labor market, tenants can obtain
better terms and sometimes even determine the type of tenancy arrangement they have with
landlords (e.g., sharecropping instead of fixed rent). These conditions highlight the importance of
taking into consideration other factor markets and the nature of the agrarian structure when
looking at how lease markets function.
Sharecrop tenancy seems to offer a package of incentives, insurance, and interlinkage to
other markets which is often best for both parties when compared to the relevant alternatives.
Both formal and informal mechanisms are observed that appear to reduce/resolve the agency
problem. This observation is consistent with the conclusion that cultivation under share tenancy
is not less efficient or less productive than other forms of tenancy. However, because the ability
to screen prospective tenants and assure adequate labor effort varies and because of
methodological problems in empirical research, there is still no consensus regarding the relative
efficiency of various forms of tenancy.
We now have an abundance of research which demonstrates, both in theory and in practice,
that while a particular form of tenancy may not be efficient in an economically perfect world, in
many instances the type of contract which prevails is optimal in the real world.51
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